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REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE USE
OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS TO THE KING
COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
INTRODUCTION

The King County formed the Task Force on the Use of Criminal
Sanctions as part of the King County Bar Association's Drug Policy
Project to examine current criminal sanctions related to the nonmedical use of drugs both in Washington and on the federal level.
The founders charged the Task Force with the goal of assessing the
effectiveness of criminal sanctions in reducing both illegal drug use
and drug-related crime, and assessing the public costs associated
with the use of criminal sanctions.
The Task Force and the King County Bar Association's Drug
Policy Project's principal focus is the class of substances that the
"War on Drugs" is currently targeting. This Report, therefore,
mainly discusses those drugs,1 that the possession and sale of is
prohibited by current law. Alcohol, tobacco, and prescription
drugs are mentioned in passing, particularly for comparing policy
responses to drug use.
In addition to assessing the effectiveness and cost of drug-related
criminal sanctions, the Task Force evaluated the extent to which
those criminal sanctions are satisfying the objectives of the criminal
law. 2 Furthermore, the Task Force reviewed the War on Drugs'
1. The word "drug" has been defined in its most general sense as "any substance
other than food, which by its chemical nature affects the structure or function of the
living organism." RAYMOND P. SHAFER ET AL., NAT'L COMM'N ON MARIJUANA &

9 (1972). For the
purpose of public policy analysis, the word "drug" has been more narrowly defined as
"[any] psychoactive substance capable of being used recreationally." FRANKLIN E.
DRUG ABUSE, DRUG USE IN AMERICA: PROBLEM IN PERSPECTIVE

ZIMRING &

GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG

CONTROL

31

(1992). These definitions make no distinction between licit and illicit substances because of the confusion inherent in attempting to make legality a criterion for classifying a substance as a "drug." Id. at 32. For purposes of the discussion in this Report,
however, the word "drug" should be understood in an even narrower sense, as any
psychoactive substance whose sale and possession are prohibited by current law.
This, essentially, describes those substances that are the focus of the War on Drugs.
2. As a guide to this analysis, the Task Force looked to the stated purposes of
Washington's Sentencing Reform Act, which include:
1) proportionality of punishment to the seriousness of the offense and the
offender's criminal history;

2) promotion of justice and respect for the law;
3) commensurate treatment of similarly-situated offenders;
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harmful side effects and recent attempts to reform the prevailing
drug policy. The Task Force drew specific conclusions regarding
the state response to drug use and the provision of drug addiction
treatment. Anticipating that statutory changes will be considered,
the Task Force formulated a set of principles to guide the development of an alternative approach to the problem of drug abuse that
is more effective, less expensive, and more humane.
I.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Task Force engaged in a comprehensive review of available
information related to the use of criminal sanctions as a means to
discourage drug use and to address the problems arising from drug
abuse, and arrived at the following findings:
A.

Current Criminal Sanctions Related to Drugs

" Criminal sanctions imposed in Washington for the possession
and sale of drugs are more severe than in many other states.
" First-time, non-violent offenders convicted of selling any
amount of heroin, cocaine, or methamphetamine are subject
to a two-year prison sentence in Washington, which is four
times as long as sentences for some common violent offenses,
such as second-degree robbery and assault, and longer than
sentences for many other violent crimes and crimes against
other persons.
• Non-violent drug offenders with prior drug convictions face
especially long sentences because of unique sentencing rules in
Washington that make drug-related penalties particularly
harsh. Repeat drug offenders may receive a prison sentence
of up to twenty years, even without any violent offenses in
their conviction history.
" A large number of drug offenders that Washington sentences
to prison are indigent and homeless. These individuals' offense was the sale of a very small amount of drugs to support
their own drug dependency.
" At the federal level, mandatory minimum sentences for drug
offenses have resulted in extremely tong prison terms, longer
4)
5)
6)
7)
WASH.

protection of the public;
opportunities for offenders to improve themselves;
frugal use of state and local resources; and
reducing the risk of re-offending in the community.
REV. CODE § 9.94A.010 (1998).
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on average than for any other federal offenses except homicide and robbery.
* Contrary to the presumption that federal drug control efforts
focus on the most "serious" offenders, one-third of federal
drug offenders have never been previously arrested, twothirds of federal drug offenders have had no prior felony convictions, and ninety percent of federal drug convictions are for
non-violent offenses. Reports classify only eleven percent of
federal drug offenders as high-level dealers.
" As a result of amendments to state and federal drug laws in
the late 1980s, the average prison time served for many drug
offenses has doubled, as has the percentage of prison inmates
whose most serious charge is a non-violent drug offense.
" Alternative sentences for some drug offenders are now available in Washington, whereby courts reduce prison time and
provided addiction treatment. Fewer than twenty-five percent
of all drug offenders receive that option, however, and Washington continues to incarcerate thousands of drug offenders
without any treatment.
B. Assessing the Effectiveness of Drug-Related
Criminal Sanctions
" In the last dozen years, since the toughening of drug-related
criminal sanctions at both the state and federal levels, rates of
drug use and drug abuse either have remained relatively
steady or have increased.
" Rates of drug use, especially marijuana and cocaine, actually
declined before the recent intensification of drug-related law
enforcement and incarceration, and then increased after the
imposition of harsher criminal sanctions.
" Total public costs related to substance abuse in Washington
have continued to rise over the last decade. Alcohol, however,
is responsible for the greatest amount of public health and associated economic costs, accounting for the vast majority of
emergency room visits and the incidence of disease and premature death (from overdose and motor vehicle accidents).
• Rising costs related to illegal drugs have been due to increased
drug law enforcement and incarceration of drug offenders, not
to any increased demand for medical or social services. Even
after factoring in law enforcement and incarceration costs related to illegal drugs, alcohol continues to account for the ma-

Q
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jority-fifty-nine percent-of the total economic costs in
Washington for drug and alcohol use combined.
Crime related to drugs, including the possession and sale of
drugs and "acquisitive" property crimes resulting from the
need to support drug dependency, has increased since the
toughening of criminal sanctions over a decade ago. While arrest rates for other crime categories have held steady or risen
only modestly over the last fifteen years, arrests for drug offenses have increased by 345 percent in Washington.
Violent crime is associated with alcohol far more than with any
illegal drug, including cocaine, "crack" cocaine, and heroin.
Alcohol is a factor in over forty percent of murders, and over
fifty percent of assaults; in Washington, alcohol-related assaults outnumber assaults related to other drugs by a thirteento-one margin.
The cost of criminal justice in connection with the War on
Drugs has skyrocketed in the last decade, including more than
a doubling of the cost of incarceration for drug offenders in
Washington during that period. Combined state and federal
expenditures on an annual basis for drug law enforcement
have risen from about $10 billion in the mid-1980s, to about
$35 billion in 2001.
The increasing arrest and incarceration of drug offenders, and
the lengthening of their sentences have not only failed to reduce the prevalence of drug use, the problem of drug abuse, or
the incidence of drug offenses and drug-related crime, but also
have failed to satisfy the core objectives of the criminal justice
system. The toughening of drug-related penalties has neither
resulted in enhanced public safety in deterring drug-related
crime, nor in reducing recidivism by removing drug offenders
from the community (the "incapacitation effect").
C.

Collateral Harm from the War on Drugs

* The War on Drugs has promoted crime at the local, national,
and international levels. The drug trade is exempt from regulation and control, and high profits from inflated drug prices
(reflecting the risk of having to evade law enforcement) create
stronger incentives to continue doing business. Increased law
enforcement efforts have spawned higher levels of violence.
Even as retail prices have declined, especially for cocaine and
heroin, the international business in illicit drugs generates
about $400 billion in trade each year.
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* The criminalization of drugs has undermined public health in
many ways, including AIDS transmission through unclean
needles, the distribution of impure and hazardous substances,
and the development of higher potency and synthetic substances that may be more easily concealed, but are much more
harmful to health. In addition, the risk of criminal sanctions
has, arguably, prevented drug users from seeking medical attention, especially for addiction, and it has inhibited physicians
from providing effective pain treatment due to federal auditing of prescribed controlled substances.
" Drug cases have clogged the courts and caused delay in the
processing of other criminal and civil matters. At least half of
King County's criminal caseload is drug-related, and the recent increase in the active pending criminal caseload is due in
significant part to controlled substances cases, which account
for the highest number of pending criminal cases (even excluding drug court).
" The War on Drugs has taken a particularly hard toll on economically disadvantaged communities, both through the massive incarceration of poor young men and through the sense of
danger and disorder brought about by heavy police presence,
open-air retail drug sales, and the threat of violent turf battles.
Incarceration of drug offenders has disrupted their families,
interfered with their educational and employment opportunities, and deprived them of the right to vote. Consequently, it
has perpetuated and exacerbated the social conditions that
gave rise to drug abuse in the first place.
* Stepped-up drug law enforcement has compromised citizens'
constitutional rights, as street sweeps, wiretaps, and home
searches have impinged upon individual privacy. Persons convicted of drug offenses lose the right to vote, the right to hold
public office, and the right to serve as a juror, and getting
those rights restored after completion of the sentence is very
difficult. The United States now leads the world in per capita
imprisonment, and many of those prisoners are non-violent
drug offenders.
" Corruption among criminal justice officials has risen dramatically during the War on Drugs, as the payoffs are high and the
risks are low. Enormous profits from the drug trade have also
corrupted foreign nations, particularly where the raw materials for illegal drugs are cultivated and processed. United
States-led efforts to eradicate crops and to fight drug enter-
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prises have brought about political and economic destabilization and environmental destruction.
D.

Current Drug Policy Reforms
" Citizens in Arizona and California have approved statewide
initiatives that mandate treatment instead of incarceration for
non-violent drug offenders. Evidence from Arizona reveals
that mandating treatment as the primary response to drug use
has resulted in significant cost savings to the state and has reduced recidivism rates; early estimates from California indicate the same encouraging trend.
" "Drug courts" have been an important part of the recent paradigm shift from punishment to rehabilitation that is beginning
to take hold, as courts work with health and treatment providers to address offenders' drug dependencies. Drug courts
have saved public costs and reduced recidivism rates among
their "graduates," but only a small percentage of drug offenders (about ten percent in King County) participate in these
programs. Drug courts still operate firmly within the criminal
justice system, using criminal sanctions as tools to try to modify behavior. Ultimately, the drug court model cannot resolve
the underlying problems of treating drug use as a criminal
matter rather than as a health matter
* Some states have reduced the severity and expense of incarceration for some drug offenders, including Washington, which
expanded its Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative program
to reduce prison time and provide drug treatment for almost
one quarter of all drug offenders. Other states have begun to
roll back prison terms due to fiscal pressures, but no state, including Washington, has yet shifted the primary responsibility
for addressing drug-related harms from the criminal justice
system to the public health system.
E.

Based on these Findings, the Task Force Arrived at
the Following Conclusions:
1. The use of criminal sanctions is an ineffective means to discourage drug use or to address the problems arising from drug
abuse, and it is extremely costly in both financial and human
terms, unduly burdening the taxpayer and causing more harm
to people than the use of drugs themselves.
2. Rather than criminally punish persons for drug use per se, any
state sanction or remedy should aim at reducing the harm di-
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rectly caused to others by persons using drugs. Civil remedies,
supported by a court's contempt power, are already available
to be imposed on persons who use drugs to the detriment of
others.
3. Criminal sanctions should continue to be imposed upon persons who commit non-drug criminal offenses, but those offenders should have the opportunity to receive drug
treatment, especially if their crimes are related to chemical
dependency.
4. The state should significantly expand its investment in drug
addiction treatment, drug education, and drug abuse prevention programs, which reports have consistently shown to be
much more cost-effective responses to the problems created
by drugs in society. Washington could obtain funding for
those programs from the substantial cost savings that will accrue from no longer relying on the use of criminal sanctions.
F. Future Considerations-More Effective Regulation of Drugs
Although the vast majority of citizens acknowledge the failure of
the War on Drugs, there is no consensus on any alternative policy.
Furthermore, an impediment to any fundamental drug policy reform is the breadth of federal drug law. The Task Force concluded
that federal law should permit the states to develop their own drug
control strategies and structures, using the federal system to allow
the states to be laboratories for change and improvement of public
laws and institutions. Allowing Washington and other states to experiment with different drug control strategies and systems will
permit the development of more effective means to deal with the
problems created by drugs in our society.
As a framework for this effort, the Task Force offers the following set of guiding principles:
1) Any public policy toward drug use should result in no more
harm than the use of the drugs themselves.
2) Any public policy toward drug use should address the underlying causes and the resulting harms of drug abuse instead of
attempting to discourage drug abuse through the use of criminal sanctions.
3) The states should regulate the use of drugs in a manner that
recognizes a citizen's individual liberties while answering the
need to preserve public health, public safety, and public
order.
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4) The states should regulate the use of drugs in a manner that
uses scarce public resources as efficiently as possible.
Using these principles as a guide, the Task Force believes that the
People of Washington can fashion a drug policy that is fiscally responsible and that effectively balances the exercise of civil liberties
with the maintenance of public order, while also providing compassionate treatment to those in need.
II.

CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR DRUG OFFENSES: CURRENT
STATE OF THE LAW

The statutory underpinning of current drug policy in the United
States is the federal Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970, popularly known as the "Controlled Substances Act."' 3 Washington adopted complementary state legislation, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, drafted in 1970 by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL"), on May 21, 1971. 4 Nearly all other states have
adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act.5
The goal of the uniform state and federal controlled substances
statutes is to prevent the "illegitimate manufacture, distribution
and possession" of drugs, including the unauthorized and unregulated diversion of drugs from "legitimate" sources, i.e., pharmaceutical manufacturers.6 The statutes distinguish "improper" uses of
controlled substances from uses that are "essential for public
'7
health and safety."
The NCCUSL intended that the uniform controlled substances
statutes provide a foundation for a coordinated system of drug control. Although the statutes describe prohibited activities in detail,
they allow for state discretion in prescribing specific fines and/or
3. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1.236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1995)).
The stated premise for passage of the legislation was that "the illegal importation,
manufacture, distribution, and possession and improper use of controlled substances
have a substantial and detrimental effect on the health and general welfare of the
American people." 21 U.S.C. § 801(2).
4. 1971 Wash. Laws 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 308 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50).
5. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 36-2501 to -2553 (1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
18-18-101 to -605 (West 2002); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 4701-4796 (1995);

ANN. §§

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3300-3396 (McKinney 1993); Wis. STAT. §§ 961.01961.115 (1998). For a detailed listing and link to all the states that have adopted the
Uniform Controlled Substances Act, see the Legal Information Institute website, at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/vol9.html#consb (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
6. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES AcT, 9 U.L.A. 2 (amended 1994), available

at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ucsa94.pdf
2003).
7. Id.

(last visited Jan. 15,
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sentences. Thus, the criminal sanctions for violating those statutes
differ between the state and federal levels and among the states.
A.

Drug Offender Sentencing in Washington State

The criminal sanctions imposed in Washington for the sale and
possession of illegal drugs are severe; more severe than those imposed for drug offenses in many other states. 8 Only the possession
of forty grams or less of marijuana is a misdemeanor.
A determinate sentencing system governs felony sentencing in
Washington, which intends to ensure that offenders who commit
comparable crimes and have comparable criminal histories receive
equivalent sentences. 9 A "grid" of standard range sentences, constructed with one axis representing the seriousness of the offense,
and the other axis representing the conviction history of the offender, guides the sentencing court's discretion. 10 The way this grid
works is the more serious the offense and the more convictions in
the offender's criminal history (also known as the offender
"score"), then the longer the sentence. Although this systems permits courts to impose "exceptional" sentences outside the prescribed standard range, in practice, ninety-five percent of all
sentences fall within the standard range.11
In Washington's felony sentencing grid, the legislature has assigned "seriousness levels" for some drug offenses 12 that are significantly higher than for other, non-drug offenses, including some
8. Drug-related criminal penalties are most harsh in Michigan, New York, Nevada, and other states in the South. Washington's drug laws also impose stiff penalties. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 3300-3396; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 453.005-.730
(2000); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.401-.609. For example, the possession of
small amounts of illegal drugs is a misdemeanor under federal and most state laws,
but drug possession offenses in Washington are felonies, irrespective of the amount of
drugs possessed. Compare 21 U.S.C. § 844, with WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.401-.403.
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.505.

10. Washington's sentencing grid may be found at WASH.

REV. CODE

§ 9.94A.510.

Felony sentences are ranked by their level of seriousness in WASH. REV. CODE §
9.94A.515. The rules for scoring an offender's criminal history are found in WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.94A.525.
11. STATE OF WASH. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2000 STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING vii (2001) [hereinafter FISCAL
YEAR

2000

STATISTICAL SUMMARY].

12. For technical reasons related to sentencing calculation, the term "drug offense" is defined under Washington law to exclude possession of controlled substances
and forged prescriptions. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(18)(a). In this Report,
however, unless otherwise stated, the term "drug offense" should be understood, by
its plain meaning, to include all drug crimes, including the manufacture, sale, and
possession of illegal drugs.
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violent offenses. The following is a comparison of current sentence
lengths for various offenses committed by FIRST-TIME OFFENDERS:
TABLE I
SERIOUSNESS LEVELS AND STANDARD RANGE SENTENCES

SELECTED FELONmS
Offense

Seriousness
Level 13

Standard Range*

Methamphetamine Manufacture
(Any Amount)
Kidnapping 10

X

5 years

IX

3 years

Vill

2 years

(Violent Offense)
Burglary 10
(Violent Offense)

ViII

2 years

Vii

1.5 years

Drive-by Shooting
(Violent Offense)

VII

1.5 years

Unlawful Possession
of a Firearm 1

VII

1.5 years

Incest 10

VI
IV

1.08 years
6 months

IV

6 months

(Midpoint)

14

("Serious Violent" Offense)
Child Molestation 10
(Violent Offense)
Robbery 10
(Violent Offense)
Heroin/Cocaine Delivery
(Any Amount)
Arson 10

Robbery

20

(Violent Offense)
Assault 20
(Violent Offense)

IV_6_months

*Assumes no conviction history and thus an offender "score" of 0.

As this comparison shows, the sentence for a first-time conviction for methamphetamine manufacture is ten times as high and
the sentence for delivery of heroin or cocaine is four times as high

as the sentence for second-degree robbery or assault, regardless of
13. Id. § 9.94A.515.
14. Compare id. § 9.94A.515, with id. § 9.94A.510.
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the amount of drugs involved in the drug offense. 15 A first-time
conviction in Washington for delivery of heroin, cocaine, or
methamphetamine in any amount will result in a longer prison sentence than a first-time conviction for bribery, second-degree child
molestation, first-degree incest, intimidation of judges, juries, and
witnesses, theft of a firearm, first-degree extortion, vehicular as16
sault, and many crimes against other persons.
All offenders with prior convictions receive much longer
sentences under Washington's determinate system, but drug offenders with any prior drug convictions receive especially long
sentences. The legislature has lengthened sentences for drug offenses by assigning multiple "points" for prior drug convictions,
thus increasing the offender's criminal history score. 17 This is
called "triple scoring." For most offenses, a prior conviction counts
for one point, but many drug offenses count for three points, which
8
significantly ratchets up the sentence lengths for drug offenders.1
For example, multiple convictions for heroin or cocaine delivery
would prompt the following sentences, regardless of the amount of
drugs involved in each case:

15. Both second-degree robbery and assault are classified as violent offenses, and
both are also included on the list of offenses that constitute "strikes" in an offender's
criminal history record, under Washington's "three strikes and you're out" law. Id.
§ 9.94A.570. The "three strikes" provision requires life imprisonment without the
possibility of release after three convictions of "most serious offenses," which includes
robbery in the second degree and assault in the second degree, but not any drug
offenses. Id. § 9.94A.030(32). Nevertheless, an individual conviction of robbery in
the second degree or assault in the second degree carries only a six-month jail sentence for a first-time offender. Compare id. § 9.94A.515, with id. § 9.94A.510(1).
16. See id. § 9.94A.515 (providing the seriousness levels table for the pertinent
crimes).
17. Id. § 9.94A.525 (12).
18. Id. Along with drug offenses, violent and sex offenses are assigned more than
one point per conviction. Id. § 9.94A.525 (8), (9), (16). Prior violent offenses such as
robbery and assault earn two points and prior "serious violent" offenses, such as murder in the first degree and rape in the first degree, count for three points, as do most
prior sex offenses. Id. Otherwise, most offenses score only one point. Id.
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TABLE II

Heroin/Cocaine Delivery

Sentence
Prison
of Standard Range) 19
(Midpoint

First Offense

2 years

Second Offense
Third Offense

3.5 years
6.5 years

Fourth Offense and Beyond

10.5 years

The standard statutory maximum sentence for drug offenses in
Washington is ten years, but the legislature doubled the statutory
maximum upon the second conviction for a drug offense such as
heroin or cocaine delivery. Thus, a non-violent drug offender may
receive a sentence of up to twenty years in prison.2 °
A number of systemic factors lead to sentence lengths that the
Task Force believes are disproportionate to the social harm caused
by drug offenses. Drug offenders, as a group, have the highest recidivism rate among all classes of offenders, 21 and therefore, are
routinely exposed to "triple scoring." In addition, the law imposes
other drug-offender sentence enhancements, often causing drug offenders to serve longer sentences than non-drug offenders, including violent offenders.
average sentences imposed in Washington
A look at some 22
reveals the following:

19.
20.
where
where
Id.
21.

Compare id. § 9.94A.510, with id. § 9.94A.510(1).
Id. § 69.50.408. A drug offender could receive such a long sentence in cases
other prior felony convictions result in a higher criminal history score and
the offender is concurrently convicted and sentenced for one or other felonies.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, STATE OF WASH., RECIDIVISM: AN ANAL-

Ysis OF ADULT FELONS

14, 39 (2001) [hereinafter

RECIDIVISM].

A recent study by the

Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission found not only that drug offenders
have the highest recidivism rate, but also that they tend to commit further drug offenses and non-violent property offenses, rather than crimes of violence. Id.
22. FISCAL YEAR 2000 STATISTICAL SUMMARY, supra note 11, at 12-20.
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TABLE III
AVERAGE SENTENCES IMPOSED IN WASHINGTON

SELECTED FELONIES
Offense
Heroin/Cocaine Delivery
(School Zone Enhancement 23)
Methamphetamine Manufacture
Arson 10 (Violent Offense)
Heroin/Cocaine Delivery
(Repeat Offense)
Child Molestation 10
(Violent Offense)

(2000)

Average Sentence
Length

Number of
Cases

5 years, 7.8 mon.

36

4 years, 10.4 mon.
4 years, 1.8 mon.
4 years, 0.3 mon.

40
19
374

3 years, 5.1 mon.

120

Drive-By Shooting
(Violent Offense)

2 years, 5.8 mon.
35
2_years,_5.8_mon._35

Heroin/Cocaine Delivery
(First Offense)
Robbery 20 (Violent Offense)
Theft of a Firearm
Assault 2' (Violent Offense)
Residential Burglary

2 years, 4.3 mon.
490
2_years,_4.3_mon._490
1 year, 9.4 mon.
1 year, 6.4 mon.

276
53

1 year, 5.9 mon.
1 year, 4.9 mon.

757
714

This comparison shows how hundreds of drug offenders with a
prior history of drug offenses are serving periods of incarceration
considerably longer than that served by many violent offenders
convicted of robbery and assault.
Non-violent offenders are eligible for "earned early release"
from prison that can amount to a thirty-three percent reduction in
confinement time. 24 Even after drug offenders' term of confine23. The "school zone enhancement" does not require the defendant to be accused
of selling drugs to minors. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.435(a)(3). That is a separate
offense. This "enhancement" lengthens the prison term for drug offenses committed
near schools, as well as school bus stops and public parks. Id. The use of the school
zone enhancement is available for prosecutors to use against accused drug offenders
in almost every part of Seattle, because there are very few areas, if any, that are not
within a designated "protected" zone. Task Force members expressed particular concern about the school zone enhancement, noting that there is little or no notice of the
physical boundaries of such zones, and that the sentence enhancement applies even
during non-school hours and days. Id. Task Force members noted that the possible
addition of two years to a defendant's sentence is often used by prosecutors to induce
a plea agreement, even when the accused has an available defense, but must avoid the
risk of receiving the sentence enhancement, should the state prevail at trial.
24. Id. § 9.94A.728.
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ment, however, the Department of Corrections must supervise
them for a nine- to twelve-month period.25 This period of "community custody," supervised by the state Department of Corrections, can include frequent reporting to community corrections
officers, prohibitions on alcohol and other substance use,
mandatory drug addiction treatment, drug testing, and other conditions.26 Supervisors impose sanctions, including imprisonment, for
violations of conditions of community custody.2 7
According to judges and attorneys on the Task Force, many drug
offenders are indigent and homeless, and sell small amounts of
drugs to support their own drug dependency. 2 For those offenders
the provisions of Washington's sentencing law can be especially
harsh. The combination of "triple scoring" for prior drug offenses,
the school zone "enhancement," and the absence of any link between the amount of drugs sold and the severity of the criminal
sanction, results in extremely long prison sentences for many impoverished, drug-addicted individuals who are repeatedly arrested,
convicted, and sentenced for selling very small amounts of drugs.
B. Federal Drug Offender Sentencing
The federal sentencing system is similar to Washington's, with
determinate sentences imposed according to the seriousness of the
offense and the offender's conviction history. 29 The federal sentencing system, however, is different from Washington' s because
the former considers the types and amounts of drugs involved in
determining the seriousness of the offense and the sentence imposed." Federal law also provides for many more mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses than Washington. 3'
Many individuals, especially federal judges have long criticized
32
federal mandatory minimum sentences for their arbitrariness.
For drug offenses in particular, Congress enacted mandatory mini25. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 437-20-010 (2001).
26. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.94A.715, 9.94A.720.
27. Id. § 9.94A.737.
28. Many of the Task Force members provided this information from their own
personal experiences.
29. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235 (a)(1), 18 Stat. 1987
(1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1995)).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Margaret P. Spencer, Sentencing Drug Offenders: The Incarceration
Addiction, 40 VILL. L. REV. 335, 347-51 (1995) (noting that the Sentencing Reform
Act was intended to standardize the federal sentencing system by "embracing the
shift toward deterrence and incapacitation as the primary purpose of punishment.").
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mums in 1986 with no formal fact-finding: "No hearings, no consideration by the federal judges, no input from the Bureau of Prisons
...even [the] DEA didn't testify."33
Examples of mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses include the following:
TABLE IV
FEDERAL DRUG MINIMUM PENALTIES
SELECFD OFFENSES"_

Drug Offense

Quantity

First Offense

Second Offense

Heroin

1 kg. or more

10 years

20 years

Trafficking

5 years

Powder Cocaine

Less than 1 kg.
5 kg. or more

10 years

10 years
20 years

Trafficking

Less than 5 kg.

5 years

10 years

Crack Cocaine
35
Possession

5 grams or more

5 years

10 years

1,000 kg.
100-1,000 kg.

10 years
5 years

20 years
10 years

Marijuana
Trafficking

33. Frontline: Snitch (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 12, 1999), available at http://
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/snitch/etc/script.html
(last visited Jan. 15,
2003).
34. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1995); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, OFFENSES INVOLVING
DRUGS: GUIDELINES MANUAL 110-18 (2001).
35. Federal law distinguishes between powder cocaine and "crack" cocaine, with a
hundred-to-one ratio in the severity level between the two substances, so that the
penalty for five grams of crack cocaine, for instance, is equivalent to the penalty for
half a kilo of powder cocaine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 844(a); U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING

POLICY 158-60 (1995), available at http://www.ussc.gov/CRACK/EXEC.HTM (last
visited Jan. 15, 2003). Currently a federal offender convicted of simple possessionnot trafficking-of five or more grams of crack cocaine is subject to a five-year minimum sentence. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 844(a). This controversial provision has long
been criticized as having a disproportionately adverse effect on the inner-city poor
and racial minorities. See, e.g., Drew S. Days III, Race and the Federal CriminalJustice System: A Look at the Issue of Selective Prosecution,48 ME. L. REV. 179, 189-90
(1996); Cristian M. Stevens, Note, Criticism of Crack Cocaine Sentences Is Not What It
Is Cracked Up To Be: A Case of First Impression Within the Ongoing Crack vs. Cocaine Debate, 62 Mo. L. REV. 869, 872-75 (1997). Even in the face of equal protection
and due process challenges, however, the law has been upheld in the federal courts.
See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 981 F.2d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 411 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Watson, 953 F.2d 895, 896
(5th Cir. 1991).

514

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XXX

In addition to imprisonment, federal law can fine drug offenders
in amounts up to $8 million for an individual, or up to $20 million
for organizations or enterprises.36
Because of the lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for federal drug offenses, many non-violent drug offenders have served as
much or more time in prison than violent offenders:
TABLE V
AVERAGE TIME SERVED IN FEDERAL PRISON
SELECTED FELONIES (1997)"7
Offense

Mean

Median

Murder/Manslaughter
Robbery

61.7 months
59.9 months

40.1 months
50.5 months

Drug Trafficking
All Drug Offenses
Assault

43.2 months
42.5 months
28.2 months

40.1 months
40.0 months
18.3 months

Burglary
Auto Theft

20.4 months

15.7 months

19.1 months

15.7 months

The average period of imprisonment of drug offenders convicted
in federal courts in Washington has been longer than the national
average. In the United States District for Eastern Washington, the
mean sentence length for drug offenders is about fifty-eight
months, 38 while in the United States District for Western Washington, the mean sentence length is about forty-five to fifty-eight
months, dependingon the crime.39 Consistent with national trends,
average sentences for federal drug offenders in Washington are
longer than for most other federal offenses.40
36. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 844(a).
37. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1997, at 88 (1999).
38. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, DISTRICT, & CIRCUIT: EASTERN WASHINGTON 10 (2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS,
EASTERN
WASHINGTON],
available at http://www.ussc.gov/
JUDPACK/2001/wae0l.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
39. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, DISTRICT, & CIRCUIT: WESTERN WASHINGTON 10 (2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL SEN.
TENCING STATISTICS, WESTERN WASHINGTON], available at http://www.ussc.gov/
JUDPACK/2001/waw0l.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
40. See FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, EASTERN WASHINGTON, supra note 38,
at 10; FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, WESTERN WASHINGTON, supra note 39, at
10; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, DISTRICT, & CIRCUIT: MIDDLE TENNESSEE 10 (2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
JUDPACK/2001/tnm01.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, DISTRICT, & CIRCUIT: OREGON 10
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It might be assumed that sentences for federal drug offenses are
so long because they are more "serious" than drug offenses under
state law, or that they involve larger amounts of drugs, and/or the
involvement of hard-core criminals or organized criminal enterprises. A closer look at federal drug offender sentencing, however,
reveals a different picture. According to the United States Sentencing Commission, fifty-nine percent of all crack drug defendants
are low-level offenders, such as street sellers, and only about five
percent are classified as high-level dealers.41 In 1999, one-third of
federal drug offenders had never been previously arrested, and two
out of three federal drug offenders had no prior felony convictions."a Ninety percent of convictions on federal drug charges that
year were for non-violent offenses.43
Federal authorities have also not confined their efforts at drug
control to the most potent or deadly substances. In 1999, marijuana offenses accounted for thirty-one percent of all federal drug
cases, compared with twenty-eight percent for powder cocaine, fifteen percent for crack cocaine, fifteen percent for
methamphetamine, and only seven percent for all opiates, including heroin."
C.

Legislative Amendments-Longer Sentences and
Alternative Sentences

The relatively long prison terms for drug offenses result, in part,
from amendments to the controlled substances statutes made during the 1980s. For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 established the federal mandatory minimum sentences for drug
offenses.45 In 1988, Congress established the same mandatory minimum sentences for those convicted of conspiring to commit a drug
offense. 46 In Washington, the Omnibus Drug Act of 1989 signifi(2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/2001/orOl.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2003).
41. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 158 tbl. 18 (1995), available at http://www.ussc.
gov/CRACK/EXEC.HTM (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
42. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL DRUG OFFENDERS, 1999, WITH TRENDS 1984-99, at 4 (2001) [hereinafter FEDERAL DRUG
OFFENDERS].

43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1999)).
46. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 846).
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cantly lengthened sentences by raising the "seriousness level" of
heroin and cocaine delivery offenses, adding the "triple scoring"
provision for prior drug offenses, and establishing the two year sentence "enhancement"47 for drug offenses in the vicinity of schools,
parks, and bus stops.

As a result of these statutory changes, the number of persons in
prison for drug offenses and the average confinement time has
grown enormously. Between 1984 and 1999, the average prison
time served by federal drug offenders more than tripled. 48 In
Washington, the changes in the law also resulted in a doubling of
some prison terms, including those for one of the most common
drug offenses-heroin or cocaine delivery.49
Since 1989, Washington's prison population has increased by
over 125 percent, far exceeding the twenty-one percent increase in
the state general population during the same period.5" The increased prison admissions for drug offenses and property offenses
related to drugs, as well as by the longer sentences served by drug
offenders, significantly fueled prison population growth. 51 According to the state Department of Corrections, a non-violent drug
crime is the most serious charge for about twenty-four percent of
current prison inmates, compared with about seventeen percent of
inmates in 1990.52
47. Sub. H.B. 1793, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE.
§§ 69.50.408 (1997) (discussing second offenses generally), 69.50.435(a) (1997) (supporting the second year enhancement).
48. FEDERAL DRUG OFFENDERS, supra note 42, at 7. Federal prosecutors charged
29,306 people with drug offenses in 1999, compared to 11,854 in 1984. Id. The median prison term for federal drug offenders increased from about two years in 1986 to
about 3.5 years in 1999. Id.
49. H.B. 2628, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998); WASH. REV. CODE § 69.50.401.
Before 1989, first-time offenders convicted of heroin or cocaine delivery faced a
twelve to fourteen month prison sentence. Compare 1989 Wash. Laws ch. 271 §§ 101111, with WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.510(1) (changing the seriousness levels from VI
to VIII). Today, such first-time offenders are subject to a maximum of ten year prison
term. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.510(1). More recently, the legislature has also increased penalties for other drug offenses. For instance, a first-time conviction for
manufacturing methamphetamine now calls for up to a ten-year prison sentence. Id.
§ 69.50.401(a)(1)(ii).
50. Compare CASELOAD

FORECAST COUNCIL, ADULT CORRECTIONS CASELOAD

1 (2001), available at http://www.wa.gov/cfc/Pubs/Adult-Corrections_
2001.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMFORECASTS
MERCE,

U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU

STATE AND

COUNTY

QUICK FACTS:

WASHINGTON

(2002), available at http://www.quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/53000.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
51. CASELOAD. FORECAST COUNCIL, supra note 50, at 2.
52. WASH. DEP'T OF CORR., OFFENDER-BASED TRACKING SYSTEM REPORT As
oF DECEMBER

31, 2000, at 5 (2000).
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Some recent amendments to the controlled substances statutes
have had the effect of reducing prison time for some drug offenses.
At the federal level, Congress recently created certain exemptions
from mandatory minimum sentences in recognition that low-level
drug offenders are serving prison terms grossly disproportionate to
the seriousness of their offenses. The Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 exempted certain first-time, non-violent
drug offenders from statutory minimum penalties and provided eligible offenders who successfully complete a drug treatment program while incarcerated with the opportunity for early release (up
to one year).53
In Washington, recent changes have also reduced prison time for
some drug offenses. In particular, the legislature enacted the Drug
Offender Sentencing Alternative ("D.O.S.A.") in recognition of
the close link between drug addiction and non-violent drug offenses, and of the need to address the drug dependencies that the
legislature thinks will prompt those offenses.54 D.O.S.A. gives
courts the discretion to cut the term of confinement in half and to
mandate addiction treatment for eligible offenders.5 5 In the beginning, fewer than fifty offenders per year participated in the
D.O.S.A. program because of limited eligibility. In 1999, the legislature extended D.O.S.A. eligibility to all non-violent drug offenders and even to non-drug offenders found by the court to have a
chemical dependency directly related to their offense.5 6 In the last
two years, courts have sentenced over 2,500 drug offenders to the
D.O.S.A. program, with over 1,000 coming from King County and
almost 500 from Pierce County. 57 This, however, amounts to less
than twenty-five percent of all convicted drug offenders.5 8 Furthermore, offenders given the D.O.S.A. option still serve a considera53. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No 103-322,
108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
54. H.B. 1549, c. 268 (1995), amended by Sub. H.B. 1006, c. 352, 56th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 1999).
55. Id. D.O.S.A. offenders are sentenced to serve the first half of their sentence in
total confinement and the second half in "community custody," supervised by the
Department of Corrections, and are required to complete a program of drug treatment that begins in prison and is continued in the community setting. Id. Offenders
failing to complete drug treatment are returned to prison to serve the remainder of

the original sentence. Id.
56. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.607 (1999).
57. Interview with Kristein Skipworth, D.O.S.A Program Manager, Washington
Department of Corrections, in Wash. (Aug. 21, 2001).
58. Id.
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ble amount of prison time-an average of 15.7 months for male
offenders and 13.6 months for female offenders.59
A major innovation in the last decade has been the "drug
court"-a local-option program of deferred prosecution coupled
with court-supervised drug treatment. 60 Drug court participants
agree to waive certain rights in exchange for dismissal of criminal
charges upon successful completion of drug treatment.6 ' These
courts use drug testing through urinalysis to ensure compliance.62
Discussed in detail below, drug courts are currently the principal
drug policy reform being implemented.63
Despite recent changes, imprisonment is still the fate of almost
all convicted drug offenders. Ninety percent of all federal drug offenders still serve time in prison.64 In Washington, authorities continue to incarcerate all offenders convicted of drug delivery
charges, irrespective of the amount of drugs involved in any case. 65
Additionally, they only offer rehabilitative sentences, including
drug treatment, to about one quarter of all drug offenders in Washington's prisons.66 In summary, despite the availability of alternative sanctions for some drug offenses, the vast majority of drug
offenders in both the state and federal systems still serve long
prison terms, most without any drug treatment.67
59. Id.
60. See infra notes 262-281 and accompanying text.
61. RICHARD S. GEBELEIN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE REBIRTH OF REHABILITATION: PROMISE AND PERILS OF DRUG COURTS 4 (2000).
62. Id. at 3.
63. See infra Part IV.B.2.
64. FEDERAL DRUG OFFENDERS, supra note 42, at 8. In 1999, twenty-one percent
of federal drug offenders were exempted from mandatory minimum sentences, but
were still sentenced to multi-year prison terms. Id. at 9.
65. Drug delivery offenders are ineligible for the "First-time Offender Waiver," a
discretionary option for non-violent offenders that allows an alternative to incarcera-

tion.

WASH. REV. CODE

§ 9.94A.650(1)(b)-(d) (2002).

66. According to the Washington Department of Corrections, about 2,500 inmates
have participated in the D.O.S.A. program, of whom about 1,000 have been released.
Interview with Kristein Skipworth, supra note 57. Today, there are about 750
D.O.S.A. participants in prison, out of about 3,175 drug offenders in prison. Id. The
county-level drug courts have diverted a much smaller percentage of offenders away
from jail or prison-only about ten percent in King County, for example. Id. In the
county jails themselves, there are very few opportunities for drug treatment. Id.
67. The Washington Department of Corrections estimates that only about onefifth of all offenders needing drug treatment actually receive it. Id. Meanwhile, both
in prisons and county jails, virtually no non-drug offenders with chemical dependency
problems receive any treatment. Id. The issue of lack of treatment opportunities for
incarcerated persons is discussed at length in the report of the King County Bar Association's Task Force on Drug Addiction Treatment. KING COUNTY BAR Ass'N, RE-
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III. How

EFFECTIVE ARE DRUG-RELATED
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS?

After thirty years of a confinement-intensive policy intended to
reduce drug abuse, and especially considering the recent increase
in the number of drug offenders spending longer periods in prison,
it seems both timely and important to evaluate whether criminal
sanctions have served their stated purpose. That is the charge of
this Task Force-to determine whether the heavy reliance on criminal sanctions has been effective in reducing drug abuse and its attendant costs. 68 The Task Force has reviewed available data from
the last dozen years in an attempt to determine whether the increased penalties enacted in the late 1980s have been associated
with any reduction in drug abuse or drug-related crime. Specific
indicators include the levels and rates of drug use and abuse, the
levels and rates of arrests and convictions for drug offenses, and
changes in public costs related to drug abuse and drug-related
crime.
Drug Use, Drug Abuse, and Drug Addiction
Most individuals derive estimates of drug use from survey data, a
somewhat unreliable measurement tool because illegal activity
tends to be under-reported. Recently, the National Academy of
Sciences further highlighted more profound methodological difficulties in measuring drug consumption and the cost of drugs, and
how the inadequacy of current data hampers the analysis of the
effectiveness of drug policy. 69 Nevertheless, the Task Force has examined available data on drug consumption to ascertain whether
A.

PORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT TO THE KING COUNTY

BAR ASSOCIATION BOARD OF TRUSTEES 13-14 (2001).

68. Task Force members acknowledge that the "effectiveness" of criminal sanctions cannot be assessed in any scientifically valid manner, but believe that statistics
related to drug use, drug-related crime, and the direct and indirect costs of law enforcement are, at the very least, instructive in considering the utility of drug-related
criminal sanctions.
69. CHARLES F. MANSKI ET AL., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, INFORMING
AMERICA'S POLICY ON ILLEGAL DRUGS: WHAT WE DON'T KNOW KEEPS HURTING

Us 75-136 (2001) (finding that, in the absence of reliable data on drug consumption, it
has been difficult to assess whether criminal enforcement of drug laws has had any
effect in reducing the overall problem), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/
0309072735/html/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). The chair of the National Research
Council panel that issued the report, economist Charles F. Manski, stated: "It is unconscionable for this country to continue to carry out a public policy of this magnitude
and cost without any way of knowing whether, and to what extent, it is having the
desired result." Press Release, National Academy of Sciences, National Research
Council, Data Sorely Lacking on Effectiveness of Nation's Drug-Enforcement Pro-
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there have been any changes in drug use patterns, and whether recent toughening of drug-related criminal sanctions might attribute
to those changes.
A snapshot from the 1999 National Household Survey on Drug
Abuse compares illegal drug use in the United
States with the use
70
of legal drugs, i.e., alcohol and tobacco:

Substance
Alcohol

TABLE VI
Ever Used
Past Year
180 million
138 million

Cigarettes
Marijuana

159 million
76 million

67 million
19.5 million

57 million
11 million

Cocaine
Crack
Heroin

25 million
6 million
3 million

3.6 million
1 million
403,000

1.5 million
413,000
208,000

Past Month
105 million

In a nation of more than 270 million people, it is difficult to characterize the extent of the use of "hard" drugs like cocaine, crack,
and heroin as anything other than slight. Frequent users of "hard"
drugs constitute less than one percent of the general population,
compared, for instance, with frequent alcohol users, who comprise
about forty percent of the U.S. population.71
In Washington, the prevalence of alcohol and other drug use is
similar to the national trends, as 92.4 percent of adults have used
alcohol and 38.6 percent of adults have used marijuana at some
time in their lives.72 As far as recent use is concerned, 55.9 percent
of adults in Washington report using alcohol in the last thirty days
from the date they where surveyed, whereas only 4.7 percent of
adults in Washington report such recent use of marijuana.73
grams (Mar. 29, 2001), available at http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_03/alia/
a1032908.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
70. OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE 1999 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG
ABUSE G-5, G-21 (2000), available at http://www.samhsa.gov/oas/nhsda/2kdetailed
tabs/Vol_1_Part_1/sectlvl.htm#1..la (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
71. Id.
72. DAVID H. ALBERT, WASH. STATE DEP'T OF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERVS., ToBACCO, ALCOHOL, AND OTHER DRUG ABUSE TRENDS IN WASHINGTON STATE, 2002
REPORT 45, 48 (2002), available at http://wwwl.dshs.wa.gov/dasa/pdf/trends02.pdf
(last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
73. Id. Although no data is available from Washington regarding past thirty-day
use of "hard" drugs, 4.3 percent of adults in Washington report having used "hard"
drugs in the last year before they were surveyed. Id. at 51.

2003]

REPORT TO THE KING COUNTY BAR

The popularity of different drugs has varied over time. For instance, marijuana use peaked around 1978, declined markedly during the 1980s, and has risen again since 1992.
Cocaine use
increased in the 1980s, peaking around 1985, and after declining,
has begun to rise again since 1993. 75 By contrast, although there
has been a slight increase since the mid-1990s, the prevalence of
heroin use has remained low. 76 In general, illicit drug use has increased since 1992, reversing a decline that began in the late 1970s.
It is noteworthy that the apparent upward trend in drug use since
the early 1990s occurred during the same period of intensified
drug-related law enforcement and incarceration brought on by the
amendments in the late 1980s, to the state and federal controlled
substances statutes. In fact, drug use generally declined before the
toughening of criminal sanctions in the 1980s and has since risen
after the increase in those penalties. 77 Considering these findings,
criminal sanctions cannot have reduced drug use in the general
population.
Drug use is difficult to measure, but measuring drug abuse is
even more problematic; the problem begins with the difficulty in
defining it. 78 The state and federal controlled substances statutes
refer merely to the "improper use" of drugs, avoiding the definitional issue by equating any use of proscribed drugs with abuse,
M
T

74. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DRUG USE TRENDS 2 (1999) [hereinafter DRUG USE TRENDS], available at
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/factsht/druguse/index.htm
(last
visited Jan. 15, 2003).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Id. at 2. The phenomenon of a decline in drug use prior to the imposition of
criminal sanctions has occurred before in the United States. See DAVID COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: OPIATE ADDICTION IN AMERICA BEFORE 1940, at 1-2, 911 (1982) (discussing the history of opium in America); DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 3-4 (1987) (discussing the history of
narcotic drugs in America). Opium consumption declined significantly in the first
decade of the 20th century, in advance of the passage of the Harrison Narcotics Act of
1914. See COURTWRIGHT, supra, at 1-2, 9-11 (discussing drug usage before and after
the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914); MUSTO, supra, at 3-4, 5 n.13 (discussing drug
usage before and after the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914). The growing public understanding of the harmful effects of opium seemed to have more effect on use than
criminal penalties. MUSTO, supra, at 3-4, 5 n.13.
78. From a public health perspective, drug abuse has been defined as the "regular
or compulsive ingestion of illicit drugs taken in substantial doses or concentrated
form." DIANA R. GORDON, THE RETURN OF THE DANGEROUS CLASSES: DRUG PROHIBITION AND POLICY POLITICS 9 (1994). Other definitions of drug abuse include the
notion of addiction and dependence, whereby drug use "assumes a functional importance for the individual concerned, such that it renders his or her other social roles
and preferences increasingly unimportant." ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 1, at 32.
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apparently on the presumption that all illicit drug use causes

harm."9 The Task Force rejects this statutory approach and believes that authorities cannot measure the extent of drug abuse by
estimating the number of persons using drugs.8 0 They also believe
that the conflation of "use" with "abuse," and the imposition of
criminal sanctions for both, impairs a consistent and useful analysis

of the relation of criminal sanctions to the problem of drug abuse. 1
Not all drug users become drug addicts, and, in fact, available
data suggests that only a small percentage of drug users need ad-

diction treatment. For instance, United States health agencies have
reported that less than one percent of those who have ever used
cocaine become daily users, and that most cocaine users are not
regular consumers of the drug.82 There is even a significant number of heroin users who are not addicted, just as there is a large
population of non-addicted drinkers.8 3
Over the past century, the percentage of the population experiencing serious drug addiction has remained very low. Seen from
this perspective, the problem of drug abuse and drug addiction in

America is "narrow and static," according to RAND Senior Fellow, Peter Reuter:
No more than 2.5 million Americans have substantial problems
with cocaine and/or heroin-less than one-fifth the number for
alcohol. Those with problems are heavily concentrated in urban
minority communities ... Methamphetamine abuse remains a
much smaller problem, while marijuana dependence, a real phenomenon involving many more people,
has much less conse84
quence for those who experience it.
79. Federal regulations that predate the Controlled Substances Act, specifically 21
C.F.R. § 166.2(e)(3) that have since been repealed expressed the assumption that the
non-medical use of controlled substances is, ipso facto, abuse, stating that "a substance has the potential for abuse [if] . . . individuals are taking the drugs on their

own initiative rather than on the basis of medical advice." State v. Albert Lee Bur,
509 P.2d 105, 107-08 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (citing 21 C.F.R. § 166.2(e)(3)).
80. Peter Reuter, Drug Use Measures: What Are They Telling Us?, NAT'L INST.
JUST. J., Apr. 1999, at 12, 12-18 (discussing the use of various drug use indicators and
what they assert), available at http://ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/jr000239.pdf (last visited Jan.
15, 2003).
81. The Task Force discussed at length how the blurred line between drug use and
drug abuse under the law raises fundamental normative and moral questions that are
at the center of the debate over current drug policy, highlighting the tension between
the exercise of individual liberties and the coercive power of the state.
82. DAN WALDORF ET AL., COCAINE CHANGES 2 (1991).
83. JOHN KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY 33 (1983).
84. Peter Reuter, The Limits of Supply-Side Drug Control, MILKEN INST. REV., 1st
Quarter 2001, at 16.
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By contrast, from a local perspective, the contemporary drug
abuse problem can take many forms and appear more serious. For
example, issues related to heroin and methamphetamine have recently aroused public concern in Washington. The Seattle-King
County Health Department recently released the report of its Heroin Task Force, finding a growing prevalence of heroin use and a
85
rise in heroin-related public health costs.

Meanwhile, in Washington's more rural areas there has been a
proliferation of methamphetamine manufacture, with severe social
and environmental consequences. 86 From the perspective of economically disadvantaged urban communities, people seriously addicted to "hard" drugs face a narrow range of treatment options,
which has been very costly in both human and economic terms in
neighborhoods already struggling with poverty and social
dislocation.87
Once again, it seems significant that the lack of improvement,
and even a worsening, in the rate of drug use and drug abuse in
Washington and across the nation have occurred during the same
period of increased criminal enforcement of drug laws. The increased arrest, convictions and incarceration of drug offenders and
85. SEATrLE-KING COUNTY DEPT. OF HEALTH, HEROIN TASK FORCE REPORT:
CONFRONTING THE PROBLEM OF HEROIN ABUSE IN SEATTLE AND KING COUNTY 4,
12-13 (2001), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/health/subabuse/heroin/heroinreport.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
86. David Fisher, Youth Summit Aims to Tackle Growing Meth Problem, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER,

May 30, 2002, at B1, available at http://www.seattlepi.nw

source.com/local/72549_meth30.shtml (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). Washington ranks
second in the nation behind California in methamphetamine manufacture. Id. According to the Washington State Department of Ecology, almost 1,500
methamphetamine "laboratories" and dump sites were reported in Washington in
2000, a thirty-fold increase in the last decade. Press Release, Department of Ecology,
Meth Labs Hit Another Record in 2000 (Feb. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Press Release,
Record in 2000], available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2001news/2001-020.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2003); Press Release, Department of Ecology, Meth Cleanups
Surpass 2000 Record (Oct. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Press Release, Surpass 2000 Record],
available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/news/2001news/2001-177.htm (last visited Jan. 15,
2003). These sites present a danger to human health and cause extensive environmental damage, especially in King and Pierce counties. See Press Release, Record in
2000, supra (discussing the record number of meth labs that were cleaned up in King
and Pierce counties).
87. ELLIOTT CURRIE, RECKONING: DRUGS, THE CITIES, AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 20, 21 (1993). Although drug abuse is a serious concern among minorities and
the poor, the notion that such problems are concentrated in urban communities is not
well founded. Recent data from Washington's Division of Alcohol and Substance
Abuse shows a higher incidence of drug use among those who are employed and/or
living above the poverty line. ALBERT, supra note 72, at 46, 49, 52.
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the lengthening of their sentences seem, at the very least, not to
have stemmed the increases in drug use or drug abuse.
B.

The Public Cost of Drug Abuse

One report estimated the total economic cost of drug abuse, including alcohol, at $2.54 billion annually in Washington.8" Public

costs related to the abuse of alcohol and other drugs amount to
about $1.5 billion annually.89 In 1998, Washington spent about
$274 million on health care related to addiction, overdoses, and
drug-related diseases, about $140 million on social services related
to economic and housing assistance, and about $145 million on
mental health services. 90
Alcohol is the drug that causes most of public spending attributable to substance abuse. A recent study prepared for the state Divi-

sion of Alcohol and Substance Abuse reported an increase during
the 1990s in the cost of addiction treatment and medical care and
an increase in the incidence of disease and death. 9t That report
shows that alcohol, not illegal drugs, gives rise to the vast majority
of those public costs.92
Public costs related to illegal drugs have also increased, but most
of those increased costs have been due to increased law enforcement and incarceration of drug offenders, not from medical or
other social service demands arising from the use of the drugs.9 3
Alcohol continues to be the major cause of public spending even
after factoring in the cost of law enforcement and incarceration of
88. THOMAS WICKIZER, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

IN WASHINGTON STATE, 1996, at 63 (1999).

89.

NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, SHOVELING UP: THE IM-

PACT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE ON STATE BUDGETS 75 (2001).

90. Id. There are also non-public costs related to drug abuse that are harder to
measure, such as increased health insurance premiums related to drug abuse and the
loss of and damage to property. Community fragmentation, fear, isolation, and other
"quality of life" concerns are even less tangible, though no less real. The report of the
King County Bar Association's Task Force on Drug Addiction Treatment more thoroughly examines the costs related to drug abuse. KING COUNTY BAR Ass'N DRUG
POLICY PROJECT, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON DRUG ADDICTION TREATMENT

TO THE KING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION BOARD OF TRUSTEES

15-21 (2001), availa-

ble at http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/KCBA-treatment.pdf (last visited Jan.
15, 2003).
91. WICKIZER, supra note 88, at 63-69.
92. Id. at 17, 22, 62. For example, alcohol accounted for eighty percent of diseases
resulting in economic loss, seventy percent of premature deaths (overdoses and motor
vehicle accidents), and ninety-five percent of non-medical motor vehicle accident
costs (insurance, administration, vehicle damage). Id.
93. Id. at 41.
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drug offenders. Alcohol accounts for fifty-nine percent of the total
economic cost of drug and alcohol abuse combined.94
National data from hospital emergency room visits show an increasing "mention" of drugs such as cocaine, heroin, marijuana,
and methamphetamine,95 but alcohol still accounts for most emergency room visits, a total of about forty percent of which are drug
or alcohol-related.96 Tobacco use also gives rise to enormous public health costs, as does the misuse of, and adverse reactions to,
prescription drugs. A survey of some of the causes of death in the
United States reveals the following:
TABLE VII
ANNUAL CAUSES OF DEATH IN THE UNITED STATES
430,70097
Tobacco
(Average from 1990 to 1994)
Alcohol (1996)
Adverse Reactions to Prescription
Drugs (1994)
Suicide (1998)
Homicide (1998)
Licit and Illicit Drug-Induced Deaths
(1998)
Non-steroidal Anti-inflammatory
Drugs (1992)
Marijuana

110,64098
106,00099
30,575100
18,272101
16,926102
7,600103
0104

94. Id. at ix.
95. OFFICE OF NAT'L

DRUG CONTROL POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DRUG USE TRENDS 4 (1999).

96. The District of Columbia recently reported that most of the drug and alcoholrelated emergency room visits are related to alcohol and not to other drugs. All
Things Considered (NPR Radio Broadcast, Sept. 21, 2001) (interview with Dr. Larry
Siegel, District of Columbia Department of Health), available at http://www.discover.
npr.org/rundowns/rundown.jhtml?prgld=2&prgDate=september/21/2001 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2003). Its survey also revealed that seven percent of the population of the
District was addicted to alcohol, compared with 1.8 percent addicted to cocaine and
0.6 percent addicted to heroin. Id.
97. The United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention notes that
"Cigarette smoking remains the leading preventable cause of death in the United
States." Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Perspectives in Disease Prevention
and Health Promotion Smoking-Attributable Mortality and Years of Potential Life
Lost-United States, 1984, 46 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 444, 449 (1997).
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Drug-Related Crime

The term "drug-related crime" is another phrase that evades a
standard definition. Two types of drug-related crime are generally
distinguished from one another: 1) "drug-defined" offenses, comprising violations of laws prohibiting the manufacturing, sale, or
possession of illegal drugs; and 2) "drug-related" offenses, which
include crimes resulting from the pharmacological effect of drugs,
property crimes, and drug sales to support drug addiction and vio10 5
lence associated with the illegal drug market.
While some drug users are involved in illegal activity beyond the
mere possession or sale of drugs, property crimes (for example,
theft, forgery, and low-level burglary) do not seem to account for
most of drug users' illegally obtained income. °6 Many drug addicts seem able to avoid having to commit such "acquisitive"
crimes altogether, supporting their habits exclusively through drug
sales, or through a combination of drug sales, pimping, and prosti98.

NAT'L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE

&

ALCOHOLISM, NUMBER OF DEATHS AND

AGE-ADJUSTED DEATH RATES PER 100,000 POPULATION FOR CATEGORIES OF ALCOHOL-RELATED MORTALITY 1 (1999), available at http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/

databases/armort0l.txt (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
99. Jason Lazarou et al., Incidence of Adverse Drug Reactions in Hospitalized Patients: A Meta-Analysis of Prospective Studies, 279 JAMA 1200, 1205 (1998). 106,000
is the mean number of fatalities caused by adverse reactions to prescription drugs. Id.
The higher and lower ranges are 76,000 and 137,000, respectively. Id.
100. Sheila L. Murphy, Deaths: FinalDatafrom 1998, 40 NAT'L VITALS STAT. REP.,
July 24, 2000, at 1, 53 tbl 10.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1, 10. "The category 'drug-induced causes' includes not only deaths from
dependent and nondependent use of drugs (legal and illegal use), but also poisoning
from medically prescribed and other drugs." Id. Additionally, "[i]t excludes accidents, homicides, and other causes indirectly related to drug use." Id.
103. Robin Tamblyn et al., Unnecessary Prescribingof NSAIDs and the Management of NSAID-Related Gastropathy in Medical Practice, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED.

429, 429-38 (1997).

104. No deaths have ever been recorded as having been directly induced by marijuana because its use is not generally associated with increased mortality. MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE 109

(Janet E. Joy et al. eds.,

1999). It is important to consider, however, that it may cause other serious health
concerns. Id. at 109-27.

105. OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, THE WHITE HOUSE, DRUG-RELATED CRIME 1, 1-5 (2000) [hereinafter DRUG RELATED CRIME]. The White House
drug policy office also refers to the so-called "drug-using lifestyle," in which the likelihood and frequency of involvement in illegal activities are increased because of participation in the "illegitimate economy." Id.

106.

PETER REUTER ET AL., MONEY FROM CRIME:

A

STUDY OF THE ECONOMICS

DRUG DEALING IN WASHINGTON, D.C. ix, 63-66 (1990)
demographics and statistics of drug dealing in Washington, D.C.).
OF

(discussing the
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tution.117 A significant number of drug addicts-possibly the majority-are legitimately employed. 08 Criminologists and criminal
justice officials acknowledge what seems to be a closd link between
illegal drug use and property crime, but the impact of drugs on the
level of any particular crime is not theoretically predictable. Nevertheless, as of December 31, 2000, Washington's prisons housed a
growing number-almost 5,400-of non-violent offenders who
were convicted of both drug offenses and property offenses. 09
Just as it is difficult to show a causal relationship between drug
use and property crime, there is no reliable way to show how the
pharmacological effects of drugs cause criminal behavior, or any
other specific behavior. 10 The White House Office of National
Drug Control Policy concedes that "it is impossible to say quantitatively how much drugs influence the occurrence of crime."'' It is
important to acknowledge that although a high percentage of crime
is associated with drug use, the converse is not true-most drug use
is not associated with crime.
While causation may be difficult to prove, it is useful, nevertheless, to observe the association of crime with certain substances.
From that perspective, it is apparent that reports link crime with
alcohol far more than any other substance. Alcohol is especially
associated with violent crime much more than any illegal drug, including cocaine, crack cocaine, and heroin.112 About forty percent
of all offenders at the state level were using alcohol at the time of
the offense for which courts convicted them, and state authorities
report alcohol as a factor in more than forty percent of murders
and almost fifty percent of assaults." 3 Data from 1996 in Washington reveals that 1,801 arrests for felonious assault were alcohol107. Id.
108. KAPLAN, supra note 83, at 54; MARK MOORE, BUY AND BUST: THE EFFECTIVE REGULATION OF AN ILLICIT MARKET IN HEROIN 70-92 (1977); REUTER ET AL.,

supra note 106, at 55-46, 62-64.
109. See WASH. DEP'T OF CORR., supra note 52, at 1-3 (providing statistics for
Washington's correction system as of December 31, 2000).
110. See NAT'L RESEARCH CTRS. BRANCH & UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY, ALCOHOL
AND DISINHIBITION: NATURE AND MEANING OF THE LINK 208-13 (Robin Room &
Gary Collins eds., 1983) (discussing the general public's notion that the use of alcohol
causes expressions of aggression and sexuality).
111. DRUG RELATED CRIME, supra note 105, at 4.
112. STEVEN BELENKO, THE NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION & SUBSTANCE ABUSE AT
COLUMBIA UNIV., BEHIND BARS: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA'S PRISON POPU-

LATION 31 (1998), available at http://www.casacolumbia.org/publications1456/publica-

tionsshow.htm?doc id=5745 (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
113. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

ALCOHOL AND CRIME:
AN ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL DATA ON THE PREVALENCE OF ALCOHOL INVOLVE-
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related, while only 144 were related to other drugs (of a total of
14
6,003 arrests that year)."
As distinguished from crime related to drug use, available data
on drug offenses per se, including the manufacture, sale, and possession of drugs, show marked increases over the last decade in
arrests, convictions, and incarceration at both the state and federal
levels. At the federal level, over eighty percent of the increase in
the federal prison population from 1985 to 1995 was due to increased drug convictions;' 1 5 drug offenders in 1998 constituted over
fifty-eight percent of all federal inmates, a significant increase from
the decade before.' 6 The number of drug offenders sentenced at
the federal level more than doubled from 1990 to 1998, from 30,470
to 63,011.117
At the state level, arrests for drug offenses nationwide increased
by over thirty-five percent between 1990 and 1999.118 By contrast,
during the same period there was a notable downward trend in arrests nationwide for driving while intoxicated (a twenty-seven percent decrease)." 9 It is useful to note that drug offenses increased
significantly after the toughening of drug-related criminal sanctions, whereas drunk driving seemed to decline during the same
period, which featured a concerted community and media campaign to alter the norms around drunk driving, along with some
increases in DUI-related penalties. This may suggest that social
sanctions, such as the disapproval of peers and the stigma attached
to potentially hazardous activities, have been more effective than
criminal sanctions in reducing the harms related to substance
abuse.
In Washington, the trends in arrests, convictions, and incarceration over the last decade reveal a distinct divergence between drug
20-21 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov//bjs/pub/pdf/ac.pdf
(last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
114. WICKIZER, supra note 88, at 27.
115. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1996, at 11 (1997), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p96.pdf
(last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
116. ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 1999, at 12 (2000),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p99.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
117. Id.
118. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME
REPORTS: CRIMES IN THE UNITED STATES 1999, at 216 (2000), available at http://
www.fbi.gov/ucr/Cius_99/99crime/99c4-01.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). Arrests for
state-level "drug abuse violations" increased from 589,944 to 805,024 during the
1990s. Id.
119. Id. DUI arrests nationwide declined from 1,021,753 to 749,454 during the
1990s. Id.
MENT IN CRIME
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offenses and other offenses. In 1989 and 1990, the state legislature
not only increased sentence lengths for drug offenses, but also for
many violent and sex offenses.1 20 Since the mid-1980s, arrests for
homicide have declined in absolute terms, and arrests and convictions for rape, robbery, and assault have risen, but at a rate roughly
commensurate with the rate of increase in the size of the general
population.12 1 Arrests for drug offenses, however, have continued
to rise at a much faster pace.122
Records of arrests for various offenses since 1985 reveal the
1 23
following:
TABLE VIII
ARRESTS FOR SELECTED OFFENSE CATEGORIES
WASHINGTON STATE
Offense
Homicide
Robbery
Rape
Assault
Drug Offenses

1985 Arrests
220
1,346
839
4,280
7,802

1998 Arrests
204
2,172
948
6,400
26,902

% Change
- 7%
+ 61%
+ 13%
+ 49%
+ 345%

Considering these figures, the increase in penalties for the most
serious violent and sex crimes in Washington has arguably had
some effect in holding steady the rate of incidence of those crimes,
considering the significant population increase in Washington.1 24 It
is evident, however, that the increase in drug crime penalties has
been associated only with a continued and dramatic rise in drug
offenses during the same period. While the drug-taking behavior
of citizens has changed only marginally over time, expensive and
time-consuming law enforcement activity related to drugs has intensified dramatically.
120. See Sub. S.B. 6259, Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1990). It increased criminal penalties for
assault first degree and other "serious violent" offenses, increased the mandatory
minimum term for rape first degree, established "triple scoring" of prior sex offenses
in criminal history, and reduced the amount of earned early release time available for
"serious violent" and Class A sex offenses, among other measures. Id.
121. Compare WASH. ASS'N. OF SHERIFFS & POLICE CHIEFS, CRIME DATA 1

(2001), available at http://www.wa.gov/cfc/Cjdata/crime-data.htm (last visited Jan. 15,
2003), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 50.
122. WASH. ASS'N. OF SHERIFFS & POLICE CHIEFS, supra note 121.
123. Id.
124. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 50.
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The Cost of Criminal Justice

The last twenty years have seen a 1,200 percent increase in the
number of drug offenders in state prisons, and criminal justice costs
have risen very sharply as a result.125 As noted above, Washington's costs related to illegal drugs have increased, but mostly due to
increasing drug law enforcement and the incarceration of drug offenders, and not because of any dramatic rise in social service,
health care, or other non-criminal justice costs. 126 In 1996, the
most recent year for which data is available, law enforcement costs
related to illegal drugs, including investigation, arrest, and interdiction amounted to $202 million. 127 Legal and adjudication costs
arising from drug cases that year amounted to $22 million, or
eighty-three percent of all court costs related to drug and alcohol
cases. 2 8 The cost of incarcerating drug offenders in 1996
amounted to $36 million for local jails and more than $97 for state
prisons, more than double the cost in 1990.129 These criminal justice costs have surely continued to rise since 1996 with the continued incarceration of more and more drug offenders.
The federal criminal justice system has also spent increasing
amounts on the War on Drugs over the last dozen years. For example, since the enactment of mandatory minimum sentences for drug
offenses, Congress has increased the Federal Bureau of Prisons'
budget by 1,350 percent, from $220 million in 1986 to over $3.2
billion today.' 3° The federal budget for drug control in 2001 was
$18 billion (President George W. Bush requested $19.2 billion for
the 2002 fiscal year), and combined state and federal expenditures
for the drug control program now total approximately $35 billion
annually, a 250 percent increase from the mid-1980s when combined state and federal spending for drug control totaled about $10
billion. 3
125. See Julia Hanna, Locking Down Crime?, HARV., July-Aug. 2001, at 9 (stating
that nationwide, 236,000 drug offenders were sent to state prisons in 1998, compared
to only 19,000 in 1980) (citing Anne M. Piehl et al., The Crime Control Effects of
Incarceration,(forthcoming)).
126. WICKIZER, supra note 88, at 41.
127. Id. at 27-30.
128. Id. at 30.
129. Id. at 35.
130. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1996, at 20 (1997); OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL
POLICY, THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY: FY 1997
BUDGET SUMMARY 111 (1997).
131. Reuter, supra note 84, at 16.
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The cost of criminal justice related to drug control includes the
explicit costs of law enforcement, prosecution, defense, courts, and
corrections. With the intensification of criminal sanctions related
to drugs, the number of personnel employed in each of those agencies has risen markedly, especially in corrections and in special
drug enforcement units in police and sheriff's departments and
prosecutors' offices. 132 Beyond these explicit costs, however, are
significant implicit public costs, such as the opportunity cost of the
courts and prisons and133increased crime and corruption resulting
from drug prohibition.
Criminal sanctions have not proven to be cost-effective as a
means to reduce the societal costs of drug abuse, including crime,
violence, medical care, and lost productivity. A recent study compared the costs and benefits of varying approaches to drug control,
arriving at the following findings:
TABLE IX
REDUCING SOCIETAL COSTS OF COCAINE USE
Societal Benefit Received:
Investment of Additional $1 in:
A LOSS of 85 Cents
Source-Country Control
A LOSS of 68 Cents
Interdiction
A LOSS of 48 Cents
Domestic Enforcement
A GAIN of $7.46
Treatment

The same study found that an investment in drug treatment
reduces drug consumption by four times as much as spending the
same amount on law enforcement and seven times as much as
spending the same amount on longer prison sentences. 135 These
findings, in addition to all the other findings outlined in this Section, leave little, if any, room to dispute that current drug policy
has been ineffective in achieving its objectives, as tough criminal
sanctions for drug offenses have failed to reduce drug use, drugrelated crime, and their associated costs.

132. GORDON, supra note 78, at 38.
133. MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION 143 (1991).
134. C. PETER RYDELL & SUSAN S. EVERINGHAM, CONTROLLING COCAINE:
PLY

VERSUS DEMAND PROGRAMS XVi-ii

SUP-

(1994). This study defines "societal benefits"

as including reductions in crime, violence, medical costs, and productivity losses. Id.
at xv-xvi, 36.

135. Id. at 11-12.
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Serving the Purposes of the Criminal Law

In addition to evaluating specific effects on drug use and drug
crime, individuals should also evaluate whether current drug policy
has generally served the purposes of the criminal law. Even
though drug-related criminal sanctions have failed to reduce levels
and rates of drug use and drug offenses and the respective costs of
each, other objectives such as the promotion of justice, specific deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation may nevertheless have
been advanced, and are worth examining. The following discussion
touches upon each of the key objectives of the criminal law to determine whether current drug policy has satisfied them.
1.

Public Safety

The promotion of public safety is an overriding objective of the
criminal law, served by the deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation strategies outlined below. The authority to preserve public
safety through law enforcement is founded on the traditional police
power of the state-promoting "health, welfare, safety and
morals. "136
Law enforcement is intended to protect society from drug-related crime, for example, property crime to support drug addiction,
as well as the public disorder and violence that is associated with
drug trafficking and illegal drug "markets." '3 7 Criminal law enforcement is also aimed at protecting society from crimes that result from drug use, which include drug-related violent crime,
destruction of property, and traffic injuries and fatalities. 138 Finally, to the extent that the state is acting in loco parentis,the state
intends enforcement of drug laws to protect citizens from the ad136. Shea v. Olson, 53 P.2d 615, 619 (Wash. 1936). "Police power" has been defined by the Washington courts as an "essential element of the power to govern, and a
function that cannot be surrendered," in exercise of which the state may prescribe
laws intended to "promote the health, peace, morals, education, good order and the
welfare of the people," and the only limitation upon which is that it "must reasonably
tend to correctsome evil or promote some interest of the state, and not violate any direct
or positive mandate of the Constitution." Peden v. City of Seattle, 510 P.2d 1169, 11.71
(Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (emphasis added) (citing Shea, 53 P.2d at 619 (defining police
power)). Discussions of the shifting balance between police power and individual
rights in America date back a century. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING
WITH THE STATE 3-16 (1993) (discussing whether police power must be limited);
ERNST FREUND, POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

22 (1904) (discussing police power in comparison to citizen's rights).
137. MARK A. R. KLEIMAN, AGAINST EXCESS: DRUG POLICY FOR
127-30 (1992).
138. Id.

RESULTS
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verse health, economic, and social consequences of their own drug
use.139 The rationale for governmental intervention is the belief
that intoxication and addiction reduce capacities for self-control
and rational behavior, and that drugs are different from other commodities in that "drug [users] are less capable . . . of protecting
their own interests." 140 This reasoning does not clarify, however,
why the imposition of criminal sanctions is the most appropriate
way to protect citizens who use or abuse drugs.
The findings in this Report indicate that criminal law enforcement has not adequately protected society from the adverse effects
of drugs. Drug use and abuse, drug offenses, and drug-related
crime have all increased during the recent period of intensified law
enforcement. 41 Drug abusers and their children continue to place
inordinate burdens on social welfare and child protective services,
and they contribute to the rising cost of health care.1 42 It is apparent that the use of criminal sanctions has failed to achieve the public safety goals of drug policy.
2. Retribution
A core principle of Washington's determinate sentencing is "just
desserts," or the notion that the "punishment should fit the
crime. "143 From this perspective, given the relatively severe penalties assigned, the Washington legislature should consider drug offenses among the most serious crimes, i.e., those that cause a great
amount of harm. A number of stakeholders in Washington's criminal justice system, however, have questioned whether the punishment related to drugs is in proper proportion to the seriousness of
the conduct.1 44 Part of the difficulty in arriving at a comparatively
139. Id.
140. Id. at 27.
141. DRUG USE TRENDS, supra note 74, at 2-3.
142. Mitchell Rosenthal, In Opposition to Drug Legalization, 24 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 637, 643 (1991).
143. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.010(3) (1998) (stating that the Washington Sentencing Reform Act was created to insure that sentences are "commensurate with the
punishment imposed on others committing similar offenses.").
144. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM'N, STATE OF WASH., THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT AT CENTURY'S END 5-6 (2000). Washington's Sentencing Guidelines
Commission is considering whether some punishments for drug offenses are out of
proportion to the seriousness of those offenses, and is examining whether a new approach is necessary to deal with drug crime in general. Id. at 13-14. The Commission
is considering making new distinctions between different types of drug crimes and
drug offenders, including the concept of a sliding scale or a series of degrees of drug
crime. Id.
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just punishment is that, unlike most crimes, drug cases rarely have
specific, unwilling "victims."
The discussion of the proportionality of criminal sanctions to illegal drug activity is fraught with disagreement and confusion. Some
commentators consider drug-related punishment disproportionate
to the offense, but prison or jail, as seen from other perspectives, is
hardly threatening or punitive. Some may believe that the risk of
arrest and incarceration is an unavoidable aspect of drug use and
participation in the drug trade. Still others may consider indigent
drug offenders to be "lucky" to have food, shelter, clothing, health
service, recreation, and relative levels of physical safety as an improvement over life in an environment of urban blight. 145 Moreover, many low-level drug offenders may develop relationships with
more experienced drug offenders while in prison, and may receive
an education in "advanced drug trafficking" or other illegal undertakings.1 46 One can see the retributive function of drug-related
criminal sanctions as offset by the harm caused to society by the
criminalization of non-violent or first-time drug offenders.
3.

Deterrence

A central purpose of criminal law enforcement is deterrencethe notion that the risk of a criminal record and the loss of personal liberty are disincentives to crime. Deterrence is either specific (directed toward the particular offender) or general (directed
toward the general population). In the context of drug crime, the
legislature intended criminal sanctions to ensure that the individual's costs of the use or sale of illegal drugs will outweigh the
benefits.
Among drug offenders, there is little evidence that the threat of
criminal sanctions has much deterrent effect. Criminal sanctions
are unlikely to deter persons addicted to drugs from continued use,
because "their craving renders them incapable of a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of drug-taking behavior. ' 147 In addition, many hard-core drug addicts have little left to lose to threats
145. Spencer, supra note 32, at 370.
146. Id. at 370-71.
147. GORDON, supra note 78, at 106. Similarly, Mark Kleiman has also asserted

that the "bite of conscience and the fear of punishment" are the two great deterrents,
but that drug use "quiets the conscience and dims foresight," reducing the deterrent
value of shame or punishment. KLEIMAN, supra note 137, at 47.
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of imprisonment, having already
lost, or never had, stable families,
148
employment, or property.
Those involved in the sale of illegal drugs are likely to undertake
a similar balancing of cost and benefit. For some, the risk of arrest
does not offset the financial benefit of selling drugs. For others, it
is unlikely that the threat of criminal sanctions has sufficient influence to deter selling drugs where there is no other sufficiently wellpaid means of earning a living. The same can be said of low-level
drug sellers who are addicts themselves and who participate in the
drug trade to support their own dependency.
A recent study by the Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission reported on the recidivism rates of various classes of offenders, finding that drug offenders have the highest recidivism
rate.1 49 The report also found that drug offenders tend to re-offend
quickly after release from confinement, and that eighty-five percent of the time their subsequent offense is another drug offense or
a property offense that authorities usually assume is related to drug
addiction.' 50 California drug offenders who receive treatment in
" '
lieu of incarceration under the new Proposition 36 guidelines15
have had an average of sixteen previous arrests. 152 Again, there is
little, if any, room to dispute that drug dependence and addiction
(along with poverty) nearly eliminate the deterrent effect of the
threat of criminal punishment.
Criminal sanctions might deter casual drug users to a greater extent than addicted drug users. There are millions of casual drug
users in the United States, for whom the risk of being arrested by
the police for drug possession is very small. 153 Furthermore, because authorities estimate drug addicts to consume over eighty percent of all drugs, any attempt to deter casual users neither
diminishes overall demand, nor deters most drug use.154

148. See STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 10 (1993) (discussing drug addicts
demographics and characteristics).
149. RECIDIVISM, supra note 21, at 14, 39.
150. Id. at 14, 20.
151. See infra notes 255-261 and accompanying text.
152. Fox Butterfield, New Drug Offender ProgramDraws Unexpected Clients, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at A6.
153. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 148, at 224-28. The chances of being arrested for
drug possession have been estimated at about one in 2400. Id. at 226.
154. Id. at 10. Addicts include both daily and weekly users. Id.
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4. Incapacitation
The intent of incapacitation is to remove an offender from the
community to prevent that person from committing other offenses
and to reduce the incidence of crime in the community. Researchers measure the "incapacitation effect" by the effect of incarcera155
tion on recidivism rates.
In the 1980s, the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") attempted to shut down crack markets in New York's
Washington Heights neighborhood by arresting hundreds of drug
sellers, and by seizing the cars of over one thousand white drug
buyers from the suburbs who came into the neighborhood to buy
drugs. 156 Incapacitating all of those buyers and sellers had no effect on the demand for or the availability of crack, however, because both buyers and sellers in the drug trade could not be
arrested or imprisoned in sufficient numbers to make a difference
157
in drug abuse or drug-related crime.
A more recent study in Los Angeles examined the arrest records
of offenders convicted of drug trafficking, drug possession, robbery, and burglary in an attempt to determine the number of
crimes avoided through incarceration.158 Researchers found a significant incapacitation effect with the robbery and burglary offenders, but not with the drug trafficking or drug possession
offenders.' 59 Taking burglars and robbers off the street resulted in
a decrease in burglary and robbery, but the incarceration of the
drug offenders simply created more business opportunities for
other drug sellers. 160 Incapacitating drug offenders does not reduce the incidence of drug offenses because there is a continuous
supply of potential drug offenders to take the place of those who
courts send away to prison. 6 '
5.

Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation is the process of changing or "reforming" the behavior of offenders so that they will not commit further offenses.
155. Spencer, supra note 32, at 371.
156. ROBERT M. STUTMAN & RICHARD

ESPOSITO, DEAD ON DELIVERY: INSIDE
THE DRUG WARS, STRAIGHT FROM THE STREET 207-26, 232-33 (1992). This opera-

tion was known as Operation Clean Heights. Id. at 212.
157. Id. at 212, 225-26.
158. Jacqueline Cohen et al., HierarchicalBayesian Analysis of Arrest Rates, 93 J.
AM. STAT. ASS'N 1260, 1260 (1998).
159. Id. at 1263-69.
160. Id. at 1265.
161. GORDON, supra note 78, at 35.
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Rehabilitation was at one time the primary goal of sentencing, but
since the late 1970s the pendulum has swung toward punishment
and incapacitation.1 62 After the rapid proliferation of drug offenses in the 1980s and 1990s, the pendulum began to swing back
again, as states established "drug courts" as an alternative to the
incarceration of drug offenders.163 Drug courts defer prosecution
to allow drug users to receive addiction treatment under criminal
justice supervision, and the threat of criminal sanctions and a criminal record serve as leverage to compel illegal drug users to partici164
pate in treatment.
The emphasis on addiction treatment for drug offenders is currently the major drug policy reform the United States is implementing (discussed in greater detail below). The initial hope for
programs such as drug courts derives from their rehabilitative focus-concentrating on one behavior problem (addiction) that is
causally related to crime committed by one group of offenders. 165
Evaluations of court-ordered drug treatment have shown some reductions in drug use and recidivism, but no study has yet reliably
1 66
demonstrated that drug courts "work.
6. Restoration
The concept of restoration involves the "use of the criminal justice processes to rebuild relationships [between an offender, the
victim, and the community] disrupted by crime."' 167 The criminal
justice process holds offenders accountable for their actions before
the community and the victim, and offenders rehabilitate themselves as they repair the harm to the victim and the community.1 68
The "restorative justice" approach has been effective with some
types of non-violent offenders, particularly juvenile offenders. 169
Its relevance and applicability to drug offenders is negligible, however, because drug offenses per se are "consensual" or "victimless"
crimes. They are, therefore, not amenable to the potential for
healing and forgiveness between the perpetrator of a crime, the
162. GEBELEIN, supra note 61, at 2.
163. See id. at 2-3 (explaining how rehabilitation gained its importance as drug
courts provided an improved model).
164. Id. at 4.
165. Id. at 2-3.
166. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Drug Court Scandal, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1437,
1480 (2000) (discussing the startling fact about the vast emergence of drug courts as
fixtures of jurisprudence, that no empirical evidence exists that they actually work).
167. GEBELEIN, supra note 61, at 2.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 4.
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victim of the crime, and the larger community. The concept of restorative justice, however, highlights the approach taken by civil
courts to the harms associated with drug abuse. For example, in
family court proceedings it is common for a judge to order parties
to participate in drug treatment as a way of restoring family
relationships.
F. Summary
William J. Bennett, former White House drug "czar," stated recently that the War on Drugs once worked and that it can work
again. 170 Bennett decried the increase in drug use in the 1990s,
comparing it with the decline in drug use in the 1980s, which he
attributed to "vigorous law enforcement and interdiction coupled
with effective prevention and treatment.'

171

As the findings in this

Report convey, however, Bennett's statement bears little relationship to what has actually occurred in the last decade. Drug-related
law enforcement activity and the increasing incarceration of drug
offenders did not slack off during the 1990s, when drug use was on
the rise again. 172 In fact, the last decade has seen unprecedented
drug-related law enforcement activity and incarceration of drug
1

offenders.

73

The increasing arrest and incarceration of drug offenders and the
lengthening of prison sentences since the late 1980s has failed to
reduce the prevalence of drug use, the problem of drug abuse, the
incidence of drug offenses and drug-related crime, and the related
public costs. Furthermore, the increased criminal sanctions related
to drugs have not satisfied any of the core objectives of the criminal justice system. The toughening of penalties related to drugs has
neither contributed to increased public safety, nor has it succeeded
in deterring drug-related activity or reducing drug-related recidivism rates through incapacitation.
Recent rehabilitative options for drug offenders have largely
been a reaction to the perceived ineffectiveness of criminal sanctions. Although some encouraging reports have come from the nation's drug courts, there are still doubts about their long-term
effectiveness. Meanwhile, the large majority of drug offenders at
170. William J. Bennett, The Drug War Worked Once. It Can Again, WALL ST. J.,
May 15, 2001, at A26.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text; see also FEDERAL DRUG OFFENDERS, supra note 42, at 7 (stating that incarceration of drug offenders has more
than doubled).
173. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
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the state and federal levels continue to serve long prison terms,
most without any rehabilitative component to their sentences.
Drug offenders in Washington have more rehabilitative options
than drug offenders in other states, but the majority of offenders in
need of treatment still do not receive it. The People of Washington
continue to spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually to repeatedly confine a class of non-violent offenders who have the
highest recidivism rate because of their drug dependence. The cost
of drug-related criminal sanctions has been high, but they have not
realized this policy's promised benefit.
IV.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR CURRENT DRUG POLICY

A.

Damaging Collateral Effects of the War on Drugs
The findings described in this Report indicate that the War on
Drugs has been ineffective in reducing levels of drug use, drug
abuse, drug offenses, or other drug-related crimes. In addition, it
has caused collateral damage that has rippled through America's
disadvantaged communities and the American economy at large, as
well as the international economy and the drug-producing nations
of the world. What follows is a brief summary of some of the most
serious negative side effects of the current drug policy.
1. Promoting Crime-Trade Unfettered by Law
The War on Drugs has actually increased crime and enhanced
the profits made in the black market drug trade. Those who produce, deliver, and use illegal drugs commit crimes merely by engaging in those activities. Many drug users turn to other types of
crime in order to afford drugs that become more costly because of
drug prohibition. 174 On the supply side, the prohibition of illegal
drugs has exempted the drug trade from regulation and control,
and the resulting black market for the distribution of drugs has
spawned high levels of violence. Where there is no recourse to the
law to settle disputes or to protect the trade from competitors, drug
dealers often conduct business by force or threat of force. For example, somewhere between twenty and forty percent of murders in
174. David R. Henderson, A Humane Economist's Case for Drug Legalization, 24
U.C. DAVIS. L. REv. 655, 659 (1991). As discussed in the previous section of this
Report, non-drug crime committed by drug users is difficult to measure, but it is a
very real phenomenon. See supra Part III. Researchers have found explicit empirical
evidence that drug prohibition is directly related to crimes other than illegal drug sale
and use. See, e.g., BRUCE D. JOHNSON ET AL., TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS: THE EcoNOMICS OF CRIME AND HEROIN ABUSERS 46-47 (1985).
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the United States take place because of the black-market drug
175
business.
For the larger-scale drug sellers who operate above the street
level, very high profits from the drug trade are a strong incentive to
make "easy money" in a market that is not regulated or controlled. 176 The high profits are a direct result of government attempts to restrict the supply of illegal drugs. Interdiction and
enforcement efforts that reduce drug supply thus have become
"tantamount to taxpayer-funded price supports for organized
crime. 17 7 At the same time, those interdiction efforts have failed
17
to stop the flow of drugs needed to meet consumer demand. 1
Retail prices of illegal drugs have actually declined significantly
in recent years. In the United States over the last decade, the price
of cocaine has fallen by about fifty percent, and the price of heroin
has declined by about seventy percent. 7 9 This indicates that the
War on Drugs has not kept supply from outstripping increased demand. Despite the drop in retail prices, the international illicit
drug business has continued to realize enormous profits, generating
about $400 billion in trade each year. 8°
175. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 148, at xvii; WILLIAM WEIR, IN THE SHADOW OF
THE DOPE FIEND: AMERICA'S WAR ON DRUGS 253 (1995).
176. See Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug ProhibitionPolitics and
Reform, 40 VILL. L. REV. 383, 426-27 (1995) (discussing the benefits of legalizing
drugs).
177. RAND Institute Study Slams Drug War, DRUG POL'Y NEWS, June 29, 2001,
available at http://216.239.57.100/search?q=cache:bl2fQOBGc9AC:www.drugpolicy.
org/news/06 29 Olrand2.cfm+%22RAND+Institute+Study+Slamstrug+War%22&
hl=en&ie=utF-8 (last visited Jan. 15, 2003); Reuter, supra note 84, at 22. The so-called
"profit paradox" has been highlighted as one of the fundamental flaws in current drug
control strategy, whereby the high cost of illegal drugs-a reflection of the risk of
having to evade law enforcement-leads to higher profits, which, in turn, create
stronger incentives to continue doing business in illegal drugs. EVA BERTRAM ET AL.,
DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 11-31 (1996).
178. In the 1970s, seizures of up to 200 pounds of heroin were considered impressive, but recently there have been individual seizures of over fifteen tons of cocaine.
Venezuelan Authorities Destroy More than 15 Tonnes of Coaine, AGENCE FR. PRESS,
Aug. 30, 2001, at Int'l News. At least three-quarters of all drug shipments would have
to be intercepted in order to reduce the profitability of the international drug trade,
but it is estimated that current efforts only intercept about thirteen percent of heroin
shipments and between twenty-eight and forty percent of cocaine shipments. U.N.
OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL & CRIME PREVENTION, GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS
1999, at 51, U.N. Sales No. E.99.XI.16 (1999) [hereinafter GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG
TRENDS], available at http://www.undcp.org/pdf/report_1999-06-01l.pdf (last visited

Jan. 15, 2003).
179. GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS, supra note 178, at 86.
180. U.N. INT'L DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMME, UNDCP TECHNICAL

SERIES No. 6,
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DRUG ABUSE AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING
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2.

Undermining Public Health

The War on Drugs, in a number of ways, has exacerbated the
damage to public health inflicted by drug abuse. First, drug users
transmit AIDS and other diseases by using contaminated needles. 81 Drug users often inject drugs rather than take them in a
safer way because the drugs' cost prompts users to attempt to
achieve the same effect using less of the substance. 182 Second, in
the unregulated drug market, drug sellers may dilute a drug substance with chemicals more harmful than the drug itself.'83 Third,
in response to intensified law enforcement activity, the smuggling
of purer and higher-potency drugs has increased, allowing smugglers to transport substances in smaller, more easily concealed
quantities. 84 The combination of more potent drugs and more frequent adulteration of drugs has rendered the quality of the drug
supply extremely unpredictable, making the consumption of drugs
much more dangerous in terms of overdoses, poisoning, and possi85
bly their addictive potential.'
In addition to the increase in the potency of known drugs,
criminalization has also brought about the formulation of new, and
often highly potent, synthetic drugs. For instance, suppliers produce powerful, synthetic opiates with chemical compositions that
they can change to avoid criminal punishment.186 Another healthdamaging response to drug prohibition is the substitution of lowerpriced for higher-priced illegal drugs. 87 In Washington and elsewhere, the current proliferation of methamphetamine, which is
produced in varying and unpredictable degrees of quality and poat 3 (1998), available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/technicalseries_1998-01-01-1.pdf
(last visited Jan. 15. 2003).
181. ALBERT, supra note 72, at 85. A special exception to the trend of injectionrelated transmission of HIV/AIDS applies to Washington State, and to Seattle-King
County in particular. Id. Washington was a pioneer in the early 1990s in allowing for
needle exchanges, which has dramatically reduced the rate of injection-related AIDS
transmission to about four percent, the lowest in the nation. Id.
182. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 148, at 9, 193-94.
183. Id. at 194-97.
184. GLOBAL ILLICIT DRUG TRENDS, supra note 178, at 86-87 (stating that the
mean purity level of heroin was around six percent in 1987, but up to thirty-seven
percent by 1997, and as high as sixty percent in New York City).
185. THORNTON, supra note 133, at 89-92. The relationship between prohibition of
drugs and the reduced quality and higher potency of drugs was evident during Prohibition in the 1920s, when bootleggers sometimes used wood alcohol or other substances that resulted in a "powerful poison." Id. at*103-05.
186. Id. at 109.
187. Id. at 108. For instance the use of cocaine instead of marijuana because they
are both the same price, but cocaine is more potent. Id.

542

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XXX

tency, is an example of the synthesis of a new drug that is cheaper
and often more potent than other drugs such as cocaine or other
stimulants, and potentially much more hazardous to the user's
1 88
health.
The criminalization of drug use has arguably discouraged people
from seeking medical attention to address their medical needs, including their drug addiction; and the risk of criminal sanctions has
prevented or discouraged some drug users from taking necessary
steps to protect themselves from disease. 189 Drug abuse can lead
some people to neglect their health, but it is also conceivable that
the risk of detection and criminal prosecution is a disincentive to
seeking medical care.1 90 There is also some indication that society
stigmatizes drug users and that they receive a lower standard of
medical care when their illness is related to their known drug
1
9

use.1

The criminalization of drugs also impairs the ability of doctors to
practice effective medicine. The Federal Drug Enforcement Administration audits primary care physicians and other health professionals who prescribe controlled substances, especially opiates,
to treat pain. Even if a prescription meets the standards of the
medical board that regulates the physician's license, the DEA can
determine that the medical board should take away the federal license to prescribe controlled substances.' 92 Although physicians
are not subject to criminal sanctions, but only license revocation, in
such instances the criminalization of drugs has created an environment of fear that inhibits doctors from providing competent medical care.
188. Fisher, supra note 86, at B1; Press Release, Record in 2000, supra note 86;
Press Release, Surpass 2000 Record, supra note 86.
189. See, e.g., Manhattan:Needle Suit Can Proceed, N.Y.

TIMES,

Aug. 1, 2001, at B5

(discussing the frequency with which injection drug users have been arrested for possession of syringes that they obtained or intended to return to needle exchange sites).
190. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 148, at 193, 197-99.
191. See Brian R. Edlin et al., Is it Justifiable to Withhold Treatment for Hepatitis C
from Illicit Drug Users?, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 211, 211-14 (2001) (discussing the

withholding of medical treatment for drug users).
192. See Letter from Howard Heit, M.D., F.A.C.P., F.A.S.A.M., to United States
Senator Ron Wyden (Sept. 29, 2001) (discussing physician's fear of losing license and
right to prescribe), available at http://vww.asam.org/pain/pain-relief-promotion-act.
htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). A highly-regarded physician who is a pain treatment
specialist recently stated that "one of the primary reasons for the ineffective treatment of pain is a palpable level of fear among physicians about potential loss of their
state medical licenses or Federal registrations to prescribe controlled substances ....
[P]ractitioners prescribe controlled substances in ways that will reduce the likelihood
of investigation." Id.
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3.

Slowing the Wheels of Justice

The dramatic expansion of law enforcement activity related to
drugs in the last dozen years has clogged the court system to such
an extent that it has diverted judicial attention away from the
processing of civil cases and non-drug criminal cases. The federal
courts have been so overwhelmed with drug prosecutions that
Chief Justice Rehnquist has expressed exasperation at the burdening of federal courts with petty drug cases. 93 In Washington's
courts, judges unduly delay civil cases because of the need to process the large bulk of drug cases, which have priority because they
are criminal matters.
In the King County courts, the volume of drug cases has overloaded the dockets and consumed scarce resources that must also
be devoted to other criminal and civil cases. 194 Approximately
forty percent of the cases filed in King County courts each yearover 3,800-are controlled substances cases. 195 In addition, almost
twenty percent are "acquisitive" property cases, such as theft and
burglary.1 96 Although impossible to determine the exact number,
it is reasonable to assume that many, if not most, property cases
are drug-related, and therefore, that at least half of King County's
criminal caseload is drug-related. Controlled substances cases (excluding drug court cases) also make up the largest share of pending
cases-almost 900-which partially explains why the active pending criminal caseload has been rising for the last five years.1 97
4. Social Dislocation and Racial / Class Divisions
The War on Drugs has taken a particularly hard toll on disadvantaged communities, both because of intensified law enforcement
activity in those communities and the incarceration of residents
from those communities. 19 The focus of drug enforcement on the
193. Dan Baum, Just Say Nolo Contendere: The Drug War on Civil Liberties, NAJune 29, 1992, at 887; Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1136 (1995) (reiterating a
warning by Chief Justice Rehnquist "that incautious federalization of criminal law
threatens to overwhelm the federal justice system.").
TION,

194. SHIQUAN LIAO, KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, CRIMINAL DEPARTMENT
STATISTICAL REPORT 6 (2000).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2.
198. Another task force of the King County Bar Association's Drug Policy Project
is examining the disproportionate imposition of state authority over certain racial,
ethnic, and socioeconomic segments of the population in connection with the War on
Drugs, including consideration of possible targeting or "profiling" by law enforcement
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poor and near-poor has resulted in a massive "prisonization" of
disadvantaged young men, to the point that more poor people are
now housed within the correctional system than in public housing. 199 Law enforcement efforts to stop the drug trade in one location have only displaced "markets" from one neighborhood to
another, and the combination of open-air retail drug sales, the
threat of violent turf battles, and heavy police presence have imposed a sense of disorder and danger on those neighborhoods. °°
Drug abuse (though not drug use) is closely related to the conditions of social deprivation and community breakdown common in
disadvantaged neighborhoods. In addition to drug abuse, the increase in law enforcement and incarceration because of drugs has
perpetuated and exacerbated the social conditions that help give
rise to drug abuse in the first place. 20 ' The effects of incarceration

on the family structure have been particularly disruptive, imposing
large and apparently unmanageable burdens on single-parent families and the foster care system. Approximately two million minor
children in America have at least one parent in jail or prison.20 2
Almost seventy percent of women in local jails and state prisons
have minor children, and courts have incarcerated almost half of
the women in local jails or state prisons on drug charges.20 3 Maintaining parent-child relationships is extremely difficult for many offenders in prison, because a significant majority of parents in state
and federal prisons are incarcerated more than one hundred miles
from their last place of residence.20 4
The incarceration of minorities and the poor has further eroded
the economic security of families in those communities, resulting in
the loss of educational, employment (through job disqualification
due to criminal records), and training opportunities, as well as
losses in seniority. Drug-related incarceration has also exacted an
and of the repeated and/or lengthy incarceration of minorities and the poor for violations of drug laws.
199. CURRIE, supra note 87, at 19.
200. KLEIMAN, supra note 137, at 15,149-50; TAL KLEMENT & ELIZABETH SIGGINS,
HARVARD UNIV., A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY: ADDRESSING THE COMPLEXITIES OF
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DRUG ENFORCEMENT AND RACIAL DISPARITY IN SEATTLE 39-40 (2001).
201. KLEIMAN, supra note 137, at 149-50.
202. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & TRACY L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Special Report: WOMEN OFFENDERS 8 (1999), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/

pub/pdf/wo.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
203. Id. at 7-8.
204. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATED PARENTS
AND THEIR CHILDREN 5 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
iptc.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
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economic cost from poor communities through lost worker productivity. In Washington in 1996, impairment of gainful employment
due to the incarceration of drug offenders resulted in over $70 million in lost worker productivity.2 °5
The War on Drugs has also distorted the political, economic, and
civic cultures in poor communities. The loss of the right to vote of
those in the custody of the corrections system has arguably deepened their political alienation and the sense of impotence in their
local communities. The "normalization" of prison time and the
strengthened links between prison and the street have also limited
the chances of success in the regular economy for many of those
who come out of prison.20 6
5.

Erosion of Civil Rights

Another consequence of rising drug enforcement in the last
dozen years has been the compromise of citizens' constitutional
rights, particularly the relaxation of standards for search and
seizure and invasions of individual privacy. One example is the
United States Supreme Court's ratification of the use of highway
drug courier profiles to justify random checkpoint stops. 20 7 In addition, courts have waived the reasonable suspicion requirements
for "street sweeps" by law enforcement, whereby flanks of police
officers conduct intensive stops and searches in targeted areas of a
20 8
city.
No comparable law enforcement effort has involved more wiretaps, home searches and other encroachments on individual privacy than the War on Drugs. 20 9 Nine out of ten police departments
in the United States have paramilitary units that patrol urban areas
and serve drug-related search warrants, which are usually "no205. WICKIZER, supra note 88, at 38.

206. See Spencer, supra note 32, at 371 (discussing the effectiveness of incarceration
for drug offenders).
207. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989). In a related development, the
Drug Enforcement Administration recently persuaded rail carrier Amtrak to grant
computer access to passenger records, which most passengers likely assume to be held
in confidence by Amtrak. Robyn E. Blumner, Amtrak: The Great American Snitch
Train, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 24, 2001, at 1D. As reported in the news media,
Amtrak's incentive is a ten percent share of any cash or property seizures made from
its customers who fit a "drug courier profile." Id. Such profiles have been shown in
other contexts to be based on invidious criteria such as an individual's race. Id.
208. John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557,
584-85 (1991).
209. For example, about three-quarters of federal wiretaps are drug-related. ELEC.
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., 1969-2001 FEDERAL SURVEILLANCE 35 (2001).
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knock" entries into private homes.21 ° The dedication of such a
high level of resources toward drug-related law enforcement, along
with the focus on drugs as a motive for vehicle and personal stops
by the police, has put civil liberties at risk and has antagonized
wide segments of our citizenry. The concentration on the War on
Drugs has also drained police resources away from the fulfillment
other public safety responsibilities.
One of the most controversial features of the War on Drugs is
the authority of law enforcement to seize the assets of those arrested on drug charges. No conviction is required for an asset
seizure, and some federal circuits have even upheld asset seizures
despite the owner's eventual acquittal of drug charges.2 1 Critics of
the practice say it is "hardly distinguishable from punishment without trial," where people are deprived of their criminal procedural
rights.212 Civil asset forfeiture is also available to Washington's law
enforcement in connection with arrests for drug offenses. Although the provisions of the state asset forfeiture statute were
amended recently by the legislature, it is still possible for a property owner's assets to be seized without the owner being found
guilty by a court of any wrongdoing.213 In addition, law enforcement agencies keep the assets they seize, which creates a conflict of
interest that allows them to distort law enforcement goals to maxi'214
mize funding for their operations.
Persons convicted of felonies in Washington, including drug offenders, lose the right to vote,21 5 to hold public office,21 6 and to
211
serve as jurors. 21
Washington may also disqualify convicted per210. Peter B. Kraska & Victor E. Kappeler, MilitarizingAmerican Police: The Rise
and Normalization of ParamilitaryUnits, Soc. PROBS., Feb. 1997, at 1.
211. See United States v. Currency in the Amount of $228,536, 895 F.2d 908, 916
(2d Cir. 1990) (holding that the government has the burden of proving only that there
is probable cause for belief that a substantial connection exists between the money to
be forfeited and the exchange of a controlled substance).
212. Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit. The Drug War's Hidden
Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 49 (1998).
213. Sub. H.B. 1995, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2001). This legislature directed
that the state bears the burden of proving whether seized assets were derived from
illegal drug activity. Id. § 1(e). Previously, this had not been the case with personal
property (cars, cash, boats, etc.). Substituted House Bill 1995 also provided for the
award of attorneys' fees to parties who successfully challenge the government's forfeiture action. Id. Finally, the bill called for a legislatively-created work group to study
further possible changes to Washington's drug forfeiture statutes. Id. § 4(1).
214. Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 212, at 56.
215. WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (amended 1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 29.01.080
(1993).

216.
217.

WASH. CONST. art.
WASH. REV. CODE

1I, § 7, art. II1, § 25;
§ 2.36.070(5).

WASH. REV. CODE

§ 29.65.010(3).
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sons from acting as a personal representative218 or guardian.219 In
addition to formal consequences of criminal conviction, one of the
harshest effects of a felony record is the social stigma that poses
barriers to employment and can give rise to other unpleasant and
embarrassing situations. A great deal of confusion surrounds the
process of restoring civil rights after the completion of the sentence, and many offenders are unable to get their civil rights restored after release from custody, due to unpaid financial
obligations in connection with their sentence.22 °
Access to higher education is another "right" put in jeopardy
during the course of federal drug law enforcement. An amendment to the Higher Education Act of 1998 mandates that students
convicted of drug charges become ineligible for federal financial
aid and guaranteed student loans. 221 Yet, no other criminal offense
renders students ineligible for student loans. Accordingly, a student convicted of robbery or murder is eligible for federal financial
aid for college, but a student convicted of simple drug possession is
not eligible. Since 2000, 87,637 students in the United States have
lost their eligibility for educational financial assistance due to drug
convictions.222 Critics of this provision assert that the rule is biased
against the poor.223
The extent to which drug law enforcement has impinged upon
civil liberties is most evident in the prisons-the United States now
leads the world in per capita imprisonment. By way of comparison,
France imprisons about ninety-five per 100,000 population for all
offenses, and the United States imprisons about 150 per 100,000 for

218. Id. § 11.36.010.
219. Id. § 11.88.020(3).
220. See ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., supra note 209, at 36. According to the Washington Department of Corrections, over 3,000 offenders were officially "discharged"
in 2000, whereby their civil rights were restored; but about 10,000 offenders were
"terminated," unable to get their civil rights restored because of unpaid legal financial
obligations. Telephone interview with R. Peggy Smit, Director of Research, Washington Department of Corrections (Aug. 15, 2001).
221. Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1.581
(1998).
222. ACLU DRUG POLICY LITIG. PROJECT, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 1 (2003), available at http://www.aclu.
org/DrugPolicy/DrugPolicy.cfm?ID=11706&c=77#FileAttach (last visited Jan. 28,
2003).
223. See, e.g., Diana Jean Schemo, Students Find Drug Law Has Big Price: College
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2001, at A12 (discussing the law's affect on college students
who commits minor offenses).
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drug offenses alone.2 4 As former federal drug "czar" Barry
Mc2 25
Caffrey has stated, "We have created an American gulag.
6.

Official Corruption / Abuse of Power

One type of crime that has risen dramatically during the War on
Drugs has been corruption among criminal justice officials, even
federal judges.226 Scandals involving corruption related to drug enforcement have been uncovered in police departments in at least a
dozen major metropolitan areas, although not in Seattle or King
County.22 7 Approximately half of all police officers convicted in
FBI-led corruption cases nationally between 1993 and 1997 were
for drug-related offenses. 228 Corrupt practices include knowingly
conducting unconstitutional searches and seizures, stealing money
and drugs, selling stolen drugs, protecting drug operations, and
submitting false crime reports.229
Corruption is more likely when the potential payoff is high and
the risk of being detected is low. In this context, public officials
have a host of opportunities to benefit secretly from the illicit drug
trade, as the profitability of that trade has afforded drug traffickers
the means to attempt to corrupt public officials. As the War on
Drugs has expanded and intensified, the opportunities for corruption have seemed to grow equivalently. The illicit drug trade has
been described as "the most lucrative source of police corruption
that has ever existed in the United States. ' 230 While the integrity
of local law enforcement in Seattle and King County has not been
called into question in this regard, drug-related corruption among
public officials has caused considerable damage in other communities in the United States.
224. Reuter, supra note 84, at 16-17.
225. General Barry R. McCaffrey, Keynote Address at the Opening Plenary Session of the National Conference on Drug Abuse Prevention Research at the National
Institute on Drug Abuse, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 19, 1996).
226. See Supreme Court Order Opens Way for Possible Impeachment of Judge,
WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 1993, at A4 (discussing the possible impeachment of a federal
judge). Official corruption related to drugs has touched the federal bench, resulting
in the impeachment and removal from office of United States District Court Judges
Nixon (Miss.), Hastings (Fla.), and Aguilar (Cal.).
227. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT: INFORMATION OF
DRuG-RELATED POLICE CORRUPTION 36-37 (1998).
228. Id. at 35.
229. Id. at 8.
230. BRUCE L. BENSON & DAVID W. RASMUSSEN, THE INDEPEN. INST., INDEPENDENT POLICY REPORT: ILLICIT DRUGS AND CRIME 33 n.33 (1996).
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7.

InternationalDestabilization

The enormous profits and corruption brought about by the War
on Drugs has had particularly adverse effects on developing countries, especially those countries where the raw materials for illegal
drugs, such as coca and opium, are cultivated and processed. The
resources at the disposal of illegal drug enterprises in those countries have allowed them to corrupt their own governments, or alternatively to create their own private armies to terrorize local
officials into permitting continued drug production.231
The United States has demanded the cooperation of the governments in drug-producing countries to prosecute the drug producers
under their own laws, to eradicate poppy, coca, and marijuana
crops, to destroy drug processing facilities, and otherwise to make
it costly for drug producers and exporters to operate. 232 The current effort of the United States in Colombia and other Andean
nations involves the spraying of herbicide on croplands as well as
substantial financial and military assistance to governments fighting drug producers, left-wing rebel groups and right-wing militias,
all of whom profit handsomely from the drug trade.233 The Colombian government is cooperating, although there have been vociferous objections to the spraying of chemicals near rural villages, and
some recent calls from Colombian elected officials for the legalization of drugs.234
Unfortunately, source country drug enforcement efforts by the
United States have not had long-term success in halting drug cultivation and processing, but instead, have worsened local environmental conditions, corrupted and destabilized foreign militaries,
and disrupted foreign economies and cultures.235
231. DUKE & GROSS, supra note 148, at 6; KEVIN JACK RILEY, SNOW JOB? THE
WAR AGAINST INTERNATIONAL COCAINE TRAFFICKING 101-244 (1996) (discussing
the corruption of foreign nations that arises from the War on Drugs).
232. See, e.g., Christopher Marquis, New Drug Plan Shifts Focus in Latin America,
N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2001, at A8 (discussing the United States plan to combat drug in
Latin America by addressing their social and economic consequences); Kirk Semple,
Powell Calls Colombia an Ally vs. Terror, US Refocuses Aid to Combat Rebels, BosTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2002, at A45.
233. Marquis, supra note 232, at A8; Semple, supra note 232, at A45.
234. See World Briefing: The Americas: Colombia: Crop EradicationCan Resume,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2001, at A6 (discussing the objection to the spraying of crops by
the United States by Colombian Amazons).
235. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Commonsense Drug Policy, 77 FOREIGN AFF., Jan./
Feb. 1998, at 111, 112-13 (discussing America's Drug Policy).
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a. Special Note on Drug Trafficking and InternationalTerrorism

Since the catastrophic terrorist attacks in New York, Washington
D.C., and Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001, the United States
and its growing coalition of allies have been attempting to track
down leading terrorists and their organizations in the effort to prevent any future incidents. A significant part of that effort has been
to find and freeze the assets of terrorist organizations.236 There is
considerable evidence that terrorist organizations throughout the
world have been partially financing their operations with the use of
funds derived from illegal drug trafficking. 237 For instance, the heroin-producing poppy fields of Afghanistan have helped to fund AlQaeda, the network of terrorist groups led by Osama bin Laden.238
The links between illegal drug producers, organized crime syndicates, and terrorist groups have spread worldwide. With the assistance of local drug producers, insurgent and terrorist groups in
source countries such as Colombia, Thailand, and Pakistan have
been supplying drugs to international criminal organizations in exchange for weapons, or for cash to purchase weapons.2 3 9 These
groups have included the Shining Path in Peru, the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia ("FARC"), Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia ("AUC"), and Ejercito de Liberaci6n Nacional ("ELN")
rebels in Colombia.24 ° With the end of the Cold War and the fi236. JI Chief 'Was In Bali To Give Nod For Bar Bombs', SYDNEY MORNING HERJan. 27, 2003, at 4; Senator Decries 'Myth' of Domestic Security, Hous. CHRON.,
Jan. 25, 2003, at A27.
237. War: Part Three the Aftermath-Drugs, Drought, Warlords, Mayhem. Peace is
Dangerous,Bloody and Costly; The Experience of Afghanistan Suggests British Forces
Would Need To, INDEP. SUNDAY, Jan. 26, 2003, at 24 [hereinafter Aftermath- Drugs].
238. Evidence that Osama bin Laden was replenishing his coffers with money from
drug trafficking was first reported on CBS News (CBS Television Broadcast, May 31,
2000).
239. See Aftermath-Drugs, supra note 237; at 20; see also infra notes 240-242 and
accompanying text.
240. Mo Mowlam, Comment & Analysis: Fight Terror: Legalise the Drugs Trade:
Prohibition Only Fuels Criminality, Corruption and Violence, GUARDIAN, Sept. 19,
2002, at 22 (discussing the connection between terrorist organizations and the Shining
Path), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/drugs/Story/0,2763,794710,00.html (last
visited Jan. 15, 2003); Major Armed Players in Colombia, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 11,
2002, at Int'l News (providing a brief summary of the Colombian rebels and their
association to drugs and terrorism); Kirk Semple, Farmer's Unrest Imperils U.S. Drug
Fight in Peru, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2002, at Al (discussing the Peruvian Government's plight against the drug war and Shining Path group). Other armed groups
deriving some funding from drug trafficking have included the Kosovo Liberation
Army, the Irish Republican Army, and over thirty other groups on four continents.
See R. Thomas Naylor, Loose Cannons: Covert Commerce and Underground Finance
in the Modern Arms Black Market, 22 CRIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 45-47 (1995)
(discussing the connection between armed groups and drug traffickers).
ALD,
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nancing of proxy wars by the United States and the Soviet Union,
armed groups have turned to the illegal drug business for funding.24 ' Interpol's chief drug control officer, Iqbal Hussain Rizvi,
stated in 1994: "Drugs have taken over as the chief means of financing terrorism. "242
8.

Summary

Any public policy has the potential to bring about unwanted side
effects, but the extent of the collateral harm arising from the War
on Drugs raises fundamental questions as to whether its policy
goals are attainable without unacceptable costs. The basic finding
in this Report is that the War on Drugs has been extremely costly
and has totally failed to fulfill any of its major objectives. Not only
are drugs cheaper, purer, and more available, but also drug use,
drug dependence, and addiction are all on the rise, as are drug offenses and other crimes related to drugs. Furthermore, the devastating array of the drug enforcement system's harmful side effects
outlined above overshadows its shortcomings. The time is ripe for
reform of the current drug policy, but the question remains as to
what kind of reform will be adequate to address the profound
problems plaguing the current system.
B.

Reforming Drug Policy-Current Efforts

An increasing number of jurisdictions have attempted to reform
their drug laws in recent years. Legislatures have effected most of
these reforms at the local and state levels. At the federal level, the
United States Department of Justice has provided local "drug
courts" with assistance, but otherwise, the federal government has
limited changes in federal drug policy to increasing the severity of
penalties.243
241. Interview by Jawed Naqvi, Reuters News Agency with Iqbal Hussain Rizvi,
Interpol's Chief Drugs Officer in New Delhi, India (Dec. 15, 1994).
242. Id.
243. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING
GUIDELINES V, 65-70 (Nov. 27, 2001 & Jan. 24, 2002) (discussing proposed amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines), available at http://www.ussc.gov/
2002guid/2002N&Jpro.PDF (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). For instance, the United
States Sentencing Commission has recommended that equivalency value for the substance MDMA, commonly known as "Ecstasy," be raised from thirty-five grams to
one kilogram of marijuana-a 2857% increase over prior sentencing valuations. 2
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES i,2 (Jan. 21, 2002), available at http://www.ussc.gov/2001guid/userfrjan01.PDF

(last visited Jan. 15, 2003). The proposed amendment treats Ecstasy as being of comparable seriousness to heroin, and with heavier sanctions than powder cocaine. Id.
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States have implemented drug policy reforms in reaction to both
the fiscal and the human costs of the War on Drugs. Public officials
and the public at large have expressed increasing concern and discomfort over the continuing rise in the public expense of arrest,
prosecution, and imprisonment for drug law violations, the disproportionate impact of the current system on racial minorities and
the poor, and the perpetuation of social decay that the drug laws
were ostensibly meant to prevent.
Some public officials, including the King County Prosecuting Attorney, have stated publicly that incarceration itself does little to
resolve the harm of individual drug abuse. 44 In general, however,
policymakers have had to confront the political risks, both perceived and real, of being outspoken on the need for drug policy
reform, and this has slowed the pace of change. The most forceful
calls for reform have come from the more politically insulated public officials, such as the tenured judiciary and elected officials facing term limits. 2 45 At this point, any enacted changes have not
been truly fundamental reforms, but only measures relating to discrete issues within the existing drug control system.
1. Replacing Incarcerationwith TreatmentState Ballot Initiatives
Two of the most dramatic drug policy reforms have taken place
in Arizona and California, where voter initiatives changed the
sanctions for drug law offenses. 246 In both cases, the electorate
244. NORM MALENG, BEYOND THE 'WAR': USING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
TO BRING ADDICTS INTO TREATMENT § 3-4 (2001) (stating that although incarceration may have lessened crime and drug sales, incarceration alone does not solve the
issue of drug addiction or abuse), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/proatty/Policies/Drugleg.htm#I (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
245. See, e.g., Gilbert Gallegos, Governor to Pursue Changes in Drug Policy, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Jan. 5, 2001, at Al (stating that John Kane, senior judge of the U.S.
District Court of Denver is part of New Mexico's Governor's Drug Policy Advisory
Group that advocates for drug reform).
246. Robert Collier & Bill Wallace, State Follows San Francisco's Lead in Drug
Rehab, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 2001, at Al (discussing both Arizona's Proposition 200,
that mandated treatment for non-violent first and second drug possessor's rather than
incarceration, and California's Proposition 36, which allowed treatment in similar circumstances); Ethan A. Nadelmann, Second Thoughts on the War on Drugs; Across the
Country, the Drug Policy Reform Movement is Having Legislative and Ballot Victories,
PIrr. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 2000, at A31; Peter Slevin, Arizona's Anti-Drug Gamble: Taking Jail out of the Equation, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 2000, at A03. Other states
have also passed drug policy reform measures by voter initiative. For instance,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Maine, Nevada, Oregon, and Washingtonhave enacted medical marijuana statutes by voter initiative. Similarly, citizen initiatives in Oregon and Utah have been enacted that restrict the civil forfeiture of assets
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voted in favor of a system where treatment of drug addiction, and
not imprisonment, is the primary response to illegal drug use.
The electorate approved Arizona's Proposition 200,247 the Drug
Medicalization, Prevention and Control Act in 1996 with sixty-five
percent of the popular vote.248 Proposition 200 bars the incarceration of persons convicted of possession of a controlled substance,
and instead mandates probation with treatment for the first and
second such offenses. 249 The measure further requires the state to
make eligible for parole all persons convicted and sentenced to
prison terms for drug possession before the enactment of the new
law, so long as they would have otherwise been eligible for probation under the statute.2
To date, Arizona's Proposition 200 is the only statute with a
track record that mandates treatment as government's primary response to drug use. By replacing incarceration with treatment,
state officials estimate that Arizona saved more than $2.5 million in
its first fiscal year.251 With resources made available under Proposition 200, 98.2 percent of probationers received drug treatment,
and 77.5 percent of them tested negative for drug use during fiscal
year 1998.252 Reporting on the cost savings under Proposition 200,
in connection with drug enforcement. For a summary of each state's reforms, see the
Drug Policy Alliance website, at http://www.drugpolicy.org/statebystate (last visited
Jan. 15, 2003).

247.

ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE,

1996

BALLOT PROPOSITIONS: YOUR FUTURE... YOUR

CHOICE. VOTE! 40 (1996) [hereinafter PROPOSITION 200], available at http://
www.sosaz.com/election/1996/General/1996BallotPropsText.htm (last visited Jan. 15,

2003).

248.

ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, GENERAL ELECTION/UNOFFICIAL RESULTS

(1996),

available at http://www.sosaz.com/results/1996General/GEN5600.htm (last visited Jan.
15, 2003). Following the passage of Proposition 200, the Arizona State legislature
passed House Bill 2518, which partially reversed the ballot initiative by barring physicians from prescribing Schedule I drugs, such as marijuana, without the approval of
the Federal Food and Drug Administration and the United States Congress. H.B.
2518, 43rd Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., (Ariz. 1997), available at http://www.azleg.state.az.us
legtext/441eg/2r/bills/hb2518s.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). Popular response to this
move by the Arizona legislature came in 1998 in the form of Proposition 300, which,
by a fifty-seven percent to forty-three percent margin, invalidated HB 2518 and restored Proposition 200. ARIZ. SEC'Y OF STATE, GENERAL ELECTION/UNOFFICIAL
RESULTS (1998), available at http://www.sosaz.com/results/1998general/BM300.htm
(last visited Jan. 15, 2003). Opposition to Proposition 300 came largely from law enforcement and pharmaceutical interests, while statements in support came largely
from judges, attorneys, and physicians. PROPOSITION 200, supra note 247, at 28-40.
249. PROPOSITION 200, supra note 247, at 28.
250. Id. at 40.

251.

ARIZ. STATE SUPREME COURT, DRUG TREATMENT AND EDUCATION FUND

FY 1997-98, at 7-8 (1999), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.
gov/programs/drugcourts/documents/arizona.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
LEGISLATIVE REPORT,

252. Id. at 7, 9.
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the Arizona State Director of Adult Probation stated that "probation with treatment works ... [and that] the next step is to ensure
that effective treatment is available to all who need it (probationers), with emphasis on attendance in and completion of court-ordered substance abuse treatment programs. '253 Some members of
the Arizona judiciary have expressed similar opinions: "'Opponents of Proposition 200 said this was a 'pro-drug' initiative,' [said]
Arizona Appellate Court Judge Rudy Gerber. .. 'As it turns out,
the law is doing more to reduce crime than any other state program, and saving taxpayer dollars at the same time.' "254
The other significant drug policy reform enacted by statewide initiative was California's Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and
Crime Prevention Act of 2000, which garnered sixty-one percent of
the popular vote.255 Similar to Arizona's initiative, Proposition 36
mandates treatment in lieu of incarceration for first-and secondtime drug possession offenses.256 A key feature of the California
initiative is that successful completion of court-ordered treatment
leads to dismissal of the criminal charges, as the defendant is "released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense
of which he or she has been convicted. ' 257 Proposition 36 also directed the California legislature to allocate $120 million annually
for drug treatment as an alternative to incarceration and,258 like
Arizona's Proposition 200, requires annual reports on the effectiveness of the measure in reducing crime and public expenditures.259
While the effects of Proposition 36 are yet to be determined, the
California Legislative Analyst's Office estimates a total net savings
for the local and state governments of $100 million to $150 million
253. DOUGLAS R. NORTON, STATE OF ARIZ. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN., REPORT TO THE ARIZONA LEGISLATURE: PERFORMANCE AUDIT: ADULT PROBATION
PROGRAMS Introductory Letter (1999); BARBARA BRODERICK, THE ARIZONA EXPERIENCE: PROBATION WITH TREATMENT PROTECTS THE COMMUNITY (1999) (testifying

before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources,
Committee of Government Reform, Arizona House of Representatives), available at
http://www.supreme.state.az.us/asd/testimony.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
254. Hector Tobar, California and the West; Drug Diversion Law in Arizona Paying
Dividends; Treatment.- Early Results Indicate Low Recividism, Reduced Cost to Taxpayers Compared with Jailing Offenders. But Critics Say Statistics are Misleading, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at A3.
255. CAL. CAMPAIGN FOR NEW DRUG POLICIES, PROP 36 SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND
CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2000 [hereinafter PROPOSITION 36], at http://
www.drugreform.org/prop36 (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
256. Id. § 5 (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1 (b)(1) (West 2001)).
257. Id. (to be codified at CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210.1(d)).
258. Id. § 7 (to be codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 10.8 § 11999.5).
259. Id. (to be codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 10.8 § 11999.11).
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per year, plus an estimated one-time cost savings of between $475
million and $575 million attributable to the avoidance of additional
prison construction. 260 The estimated savings do not include specific amounts from fees paid by offenders or savings in prosecution-related expenses, each of which may potentially be millions of
26
dollars statewide. 1
Neither Arizona's evaluation of its early fiscal savings, nor California's official estimates took into account the potential economic
benefits of a reduction in recidivism, increases in employment of
probationers, and the avoidance of social welfare costs from not
removing parents and wage-earners from the community. In addition, they cannot measure the prevention of social disruption and
emotional harm to individuals and their families in objective economic terms.
Other jurisdictions, including Washington, have filed or are considering similar voter initiatives.
2. Replacing Incarcerationwith Treatment-JudicialReform
The most prominent drug policy reform effected at the local
level has been the drug court, which has signaled the beginning of a
paradigm shift away from a predominantly punitive orientation toward substance abuse and drug-related crime, to a focus on treatment and investment in human potential. The drug court model
involves a new working relationship between the criminal court
and health and treatment systems, carried out within the bounda262
ries of the criminal court's jurisdiction.
There are currently more than 785 drug courts in the United
States, with an additional 453 in the planning stage.263 By June
1999, when only 381 drug courts were in operation, an estimated
140,000 defendants had been involved in adult drug court programs, and the Justice Programs Office estimated participant reten260. CAL. CAMPAIGN FOR NEW DRUG POLICIES, CALIFORNIA TAXPAYERS AND
THE SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND CRIME PREVENTION ACT A CALIFORNIA VOTER INITIANOVEMBER 2000, AT 1 (2000), available at http://www.drugreform.org/prop36/
pdf/taxpayers.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
261. Id.
262. See GEBELEIN, supra note 61, at 2 (discussing the progress of drug courts in
TIVE -

the United States).
263. JUSTICE PROGRAMS OFFICE, AM. UNIV., OJP DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE
& TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (2001): SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY
BY STATE AND COUNTY 46 (2002) [hereinafter SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY
2001].
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tion rate at greater than seventy percent.2 64 All fifty states and a
number of American territories now have drug courts operating or
in the planning stage.26 5
In Washington, there are at least twenty-two adult, juvenile, and
tribal drug courts in operation and there are another thirteen
planned.2 66 The first drug court in Washington began in King
County in August 1994.67 Under the rules governing the King
County drug court, eligible defendants can elect to proceed with
the traditional court process or they may participate in the drug
court, which gives them the opportunity to receive drug treatment
in lieu of incarceration. Defendants who choose to participate in
the program "come under the court's supervision and are required
to attend treatment sessions, undergo random urinalysis, and appear before the drug court judge on a regular basis. ' '2 68 Defendants who satisfy the requirements for all three levels of the
program graduate from the program and the court dismisses their
charges.269 The court terminates from the program defendants
who fail to make progress and sentences them on their original
2
charge.
An initial evaluation of the King County drug court program
completed in 1998 was encouraging, showing significantly lower recidivism and drug relapse rates among its participants, compared to
other drug offenders who did not participate in the program.271 An
ongoing study of Washington's six major adult drug court programs
has been underway since 1999, conducted by the University of
264. JUSTICE PROGRAMS OFFICE, AM. UNIV., OJP DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE
& TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT (1999): DRUG COURT ACTIVITY UPDATE: SUMMARY INFORMATION § II (1999).
265. SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY 2001, supra note 263, at 46.
266. Id. at 44.
267. KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE, KING COUNTY DRUG DIVERSION COURT PROGRAM (2001), available at http://www.metrokc.gov/kcscc/
drugcourt/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. M. M. BELL, KING COUNTY DRUG COURT EVALUATION: FINAL REPORT 4
(1998). Evaluation of King County's drug court in 1998 showed an annual cost avoidance of $522,000 (including costs that would have occurred if the cases had been adjudicated in the traditional manner, as well as savings associated with reduced
recidivism). Id. at 5. Nine percent of drug court "graduates" were re-arrested for a
felony, compared to thirty-three percent of offenders who opted not to participate in
the drug court program. Id. at 4-5. Statewide, drug courts have been estimated to
save Washington taxpayers approximately $2.45 for each dollar spent. WASH. STATE
INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, CAN DRUG COURTS SAVE MONEY FOR WASHINGTON STATE
TAXPAYERS?

2 (1999).

2003]

REPORT TO THE KING COUNTY BAR

Washington's Alcohol and Drug Abuse Institute.272 The study has
been evaluating re-offense, new conviction, and re-incarceration
rates of offenders eligible for drug court who declined to enter or
who terminated treatment, compared with "graduates" of the drug
court program.273 The study's core findings show drug court "graduates" with fewer re-arrests following drug court than any of the
other offender groups.2 74 Throughout Washington, the rate of imprisonment in the post-drug court referral period is near zero.275 In
King County, the drug court graduation rate is twenty-nine percent
(number of graduates/number of offenders entering the program)
and the retention rate is forty-one percent [(graduates + active participants) / admissions].276
Due to fiscal constraints and eligibility restrictions, the drug
court program has diverted a relatively small fraction of drug offenders. Each year since the program's inception in 1994, criminal
courts have found eligible and referred to the drug court approximately 900 offenders, or twenty-one percent of all drug cases filed
in King County in one year.277 Of those who are eligible, approximately one-third have chosen the drug court option.2 78
A significant difference between the drug court model and the
diversion programs established under Arizona's Proposition 200
and California's Proposition 36 is that drug courts retain more authority to sanction or terminate drug offenders' participation for
violation of required conditions, often resulting in incarceration.
In order to be eligible for the drug court program, defendants must
waive the right to a speedy trial and the right to confront witnesses,
and they must also stipulate to the facts of the case as stated in the
police report, essentially deferring a guilty verdict in the hope of
successful completion of drug treatment.2 7 9 Drug courts may incarcerate on the original charge without trial participants who fail to
272.

GARY COX ET AL., UNIV. OF WASH., DRUG COURT EVALUATION PROJECT

FINAL REPORT Vi
273. Id. at 9-23.

(2001).

274. Id. at 9.
275. Id. at vi.
276. Telephone Interview with Mary C. Taylor, Administrator, King County Drug
Diversion Court Program (Aug. 21, 2001).
277. Id.
278. 4,258 drug cases were filed in King County in 2000, of which 1,281 were drug
delivery cases and 2,607 were drug possession cases. Id.
279. See KING COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE, supra note 267 (discussing the drug court's requirements).
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remain drug-free (which is not uncommon among drug-addicted
individuals).280

There is no way to demonstrate whether individual defendants
who succeed in drug court could have succeeded in treatment without arrest and the threat of incarceration. For defendants less amenable to drug treatment-coerced or voluntary-addressing drug
use through the criminal courts, rather than through the public
health system, often results in non-violent offenders facing lengthy
periods of incarceration that may often compound the health and
social problems associated with their addiction.81 Individual drug
court judges are specially trained and especially sensitive to these
pitfalls, but the drug court model still does not resolve the underlying problems created by a system that attempts to address drug use

as a criminal justice matter rather than as a public health matter.
3.

Sentencing Reform-State Legislation

Relatively recently, a few state legislatures have attempted to reduce the severity and expense of incarceration of drug offenders
and to increase opportunities for drug treatment. In Washington,
as mentioned above, the legislature recently expanded the Drug
Offender Sentencing Alternative program, providing an abbreviated prison sentence and drug treatment to eligible offenders.28 2

No state has yet shifted the primary responsibility for addressing
drug-related harms from law enforcement to the health system, but
there has been some movement in that direction in various states,

including Connecticut,283 Indiana,284 Louisiana, 8 5 Nevada,286 New
Mexico, and New York.287
280. Id.
281. See supra Part III.A.

282.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 9.94A.660 (supp. 2002).

283. 2001 Conn. Acts No. 01-99, Sub. S.B. 1160 (Reg. Sess.) (giving judges discretion to waive the state's mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders in individual cases).
284. IND. CODE ANN. § 12-23-6-1 (Michie 2001) (permitting drug-dependent defendants charged with or convicted of drug law violations to receive treatment instead
of prosecution or imprisonment with "the consent of the authorities concerned.").
285. 2002 La. Acts 239, enacted this year, reduced sentences for drug offenses and
other offenses.
286. Nevada recently reduced penalties for marijuana possession. A.B. 453, 2001
Leg., 71st Sess. (Nev. 2001).
287. There have been efforts to ameliorate New York State's mandatory minimum
sentences known as the "Rockefeller-era drug laws," although no measure has yet
been enacted. See Somini Sengupta, A New Plan to Roll Back Drug Terms, N.Y.
TiMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at B1 (discussing the proposal to lessen New York's mandatory
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New Mexico has made the most comprehensive attempt in the
nation to reform its drug laws. In its 2001 legislative session, with
the active support of Republican Governor Gary Johnson, they introduced ten drug policy reform bills. 2 8 Five of those bills passed
into law: syringe availability, 28 9 anti-opioid overdose treatment,29 °
early release of prison inmates convicted of non-violent drug of29129
fenses, 29
restoration of voting rights for ex-offenders,292 and expanded funding for treatment for drug addiction.293
Two bills that did not pass in New Mexico in 2001 related to
medicinal use of marijuana2 94 and civil asset forfeiture. 95 Three
other bills that the legislature considered but did not pass directly
addressed the state's system of criminal sanctions for drug related
offenses. Senate Bill 317 would have provided for treatment instead of incarceration for first- and second-time drug offenders in
cases involving one to eight ounces of marijuana or two grams or
less of cocaine, heroin, or other controlled substance. 96 The court
would reduce the criminal offense in such cases to a misdemeanor
and it would have resulted in conditional discharge (i.e., probation).2 97 New Mexico judges would have had discretion to require
offenders to participate in drug treatment, thereby preserving limited treatment services for those truly drug-addicted. 98
"Current law in New Mexico provides that if a prosecutor
charges an offender as a 'habitual offender,' the sentencing judge
must apply an enhancement to the person's sentence.

'299

Senate

Bill 313 would have amended the habitual offender statute in New
Mexico by restoring judicial discretion in determining whether to
try defendants as habitual offenders in cases involving past or present use or sale of controlled substances.30 0
drug sentencing and more judicial discretion to impose treatment rather than prison
time).
288. Gary Johnson, Drug Policy Reform Proposals2001 RegularSession of the New
Mexico State Legislature, Mar. 2, 2001.
289. S.B. 320, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
290. H.B. 813, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
291. S.B. 200, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
292. S.B. 204, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
293. S.B. 628, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
294. H.B. 431, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001).
295. S.B. 314, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001); H.B. 18, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M.

2001).
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

S.B. 317, 45th Leg., 1st. Sess. (N.M. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Johnson, supra note 288.
S.B. 313, 45th Leg., 1st. Sess. (N.M. 2001).
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The third fundamental reform considered but not enacted in
New Mexico in 2001 was Senate Bill 315, which would have
decriminalized possession by adults of one ounce or less of marijuana.0 1 While marijuana would have remained illegal, there
would have been no criminal penalty for its possession, but instead
a $100 fine for a first violation and $500 fine for subsequent possession charges.3 °2 A law enforcement officer could issue a warning or
a citation requiring the offender to pay the fine by mail or in person at a magistrate's court.30 3 The person receiving the citation
could also appear in magistrate's court in a civil proceeding to contest the citation.30 4 Money collected from such citations would go
into the state general fund.3 °5
Although these three proposals that would have reformed criminal sanctions for drug offenses in New Mexico were not ultimately
enacted, none lost a committee or floor vote. This alone evidences
a significant shift in attitude among elected officials in that state, as
does the mere fact that the legislature introduced and seriously
considered the bills.
In the 2001 session of the Washington Legislature, there was also
an attempt to reform sentencing in drug offense cases. Senate Bill
5419, in its original form, was similar to California's Proposition 36
and New Mexico's Senate Bill 317 in that it mandated treatment
instead of incarceration for non-violent drug offenders.30 6 The
King County Bar Association endorsed this bill.30 7 A committee
amendment to the bill, however, removed all reference to treatment for non-violent drug offenders as an alternative to incarceration. In its place was substituted a provision that would slightly
reduce the length of incarceration for some drug delivery offenses,
retaining the basic policy of incarcerating drug offenders. 30 8 The
301. S.B. 315, 45th Leg., 1st. Sess. (N.M. 2001).
302. Id. § I(A).
303. Id. § I(B).
304. Id. § 1(C).
305. Id. § 1(G).
306. S.B. 5419, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2001) (original form); see H.B. 1722,
57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2001); see also S.B. 317, 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001);
PROPOSITION 36, supra note 255.
307. Letter from the King County Bar Association to the Judiciary Committee of
the Washington State Senate, Re: Drug Law Reform-2001 Legislative Session, (Feb.
8, 2001) (on file with author).
308. Compare S.B. 5419, § 3 (original form), with S.B. Rep. No. 5419 (explaining
that the bill, as finally enacted would reduce the length of incarceration for some drug
delivery offenses rather than merely mandating treatment).
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legislature was to allocate moneys
saved by shortened prison terms
3 9
to drug treatment programs. 0
The drafter and primary promoter of the amended Senate Bill
5419 was the King County Prosecuting Attorney, who called for a
new policy:
A new approach to drug policy must look to law enforcement
and the criminal justice system to play three critical roles:
* First, to apprehend and incarcerate those who profit from the
misery of drugs. This includes the importers, manufacturers,
and dealers.
* Second, the criminal justice system can provide an effective
intervention point to leverage drug addicts into treatment. We
have learned over the last decade that courts can coerce addicts into treatment. In many cases, it takes an arrest and the
threat of incarceration to bring about the motivation and selfrealization for an addicted person to confront the fact and
consequences of their own addiction,
* Third, our society must provide a consistent message to our
youngest citizens that drug use is wrong and harmful. This
message can be delivered in a variety of ways within a school
curriculum. It must be reinforced by maintaining laws against
illegal drug use.31 °
Observing that "drug treatment works," the King County prosecutor has lamented the inadequacy of addiction treatment opportunities, commenting that, "with the notable exceptions of drug
courts ... and the Drug Offender Sentencing Alternative ...the
criminal justice system has no treatment alternatives to incarceration. '3 11 The criminal justice system, however, still supervises drug
treatment, rather than leaving it in the hands of medical service
providers and drug treatment specialists. While recommending a
much-needed expansion of rehabilitative options for drug offenders, the latest reform proposal for Washington still only intends to
modify the current system of criminal sanctions.
There is still a high level of interest in drug policy reform, both
because of the potential cost savings and because of the prospect of
a more effective means to address the drug abuse problem. As this
important debate continues, however, it remains to be seen
309. S.B. 5419, § 2. Savings from imposing shorter prison terms on drug offenders
were to be placed in a Criminal Justice Treatment Account. Id.
310. MALENG, supra note 244, § 1.
311. Id. § 2.

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XXX

whether legislatures will enact more fundamental reforms or
merely tinker around the edges of current drug policy.
V.

TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE DRUG POLICY

In its examination of criminal sanctions related to drugs, the
Task Force considered whether current drug policy is serving essential public policy objectives. Among the most important of those
objectives are:
1. Enhanced public order and reduced crime.
2. Improved public health.
3. Protection of children.
4. Efficient use of scarce public resources.
This Report finds that the War on Drugs has not only failed to
fulfill any of these objectives, but it has also exacerbated the very
problems it was designed to address.
Unfortunately, the findings in this Report are neither new nor
surprising. From the very beginning of the modern era of drug
control, it was recognized that "law enforcement may not be the
ultimate solution to the drug abuse problem. ' '312 Many scholarly
studies, including the work of other bar associations, have come to
313
the same conclusion.
312. UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, 9 U.L.A. 2 (amended 1994), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ucsa94.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,

2003). The drafters of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act expressed this reservation and hoped for an expansion of research related to "rehabilitation, treatment and
educational programs for addicts, drug dependent persons and potential drug abusers." Id.
313. See, e.g., Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., A WISER COURSE: ENDING
DRUG PROHIBITION: A REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON DRUGS AND THE
LAW OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 3-5 (1994) [here-

inafter A WISER COURSE], available at http://www.beyond-the-illusion.com/files/Mirrors/HyperReal-Archive/drugs/politics/legalization/wiser.course/ (last visited Jan. 15,

2003);

JOINT COMM. OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N & THE AM. MED. ASs'N ON NARCOTIC
DRUGS, DRUG ADDICTION: CRIME OR DISEASE?: INTERIM AND FINAL REPORTS 15-

23 (1961).
Commentator Herbert Packer concluded in 1968 that:
The results of . . . reliance on the criminal sanction have included the
following:
(1) Several hundred thousand people, the overwhelming majority of whom
have been primarily users rather than traffickers, have been subjected
to severe criminal punishment.
(2) An immensely profitable illegal traffic in narcotic and other forbidden
drugs has developed.
(3) This illegal traffic has contributed significantly to the growth and prosperity of organized criminal groups.
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The Shift from Criminal Justice to Public Health

of
Although the vast majority of citizens acknowledge the failure 314
current drug policy, there is no consensus about alternatives.
Furthermore, the polarization of the drug policy debate between
the "prohibitionists" and the "legalizers" has prevented measured
and dispassionate consideration of the complex issues surrounding
criminal sanctions for non-medical drug use.315 The lack of meaningful dialogue on drug policy has largely precluded the design of
(4)
(5)

A substantial number of all acquisitive crimes ... have been committed
by drug users in order to get the wherewithal to pay the artificially high
prices charged for drugs on the illegal market.
Billions of dollars and a significant proportion of total law enforcement

resources have been expended in all stages of the criminal process.
A disturbingly large number of undesirable police practices . . . have
become habitual because of the great difficulty that attends the detection of narcotics offenses.
(7) The burden of enforcement has fallen primarily on the urban poor, especially [African-Americans] and Mexican-Americans.
(8) Research on the causes, effects, and cures of drug use has been
stultified.
(9) The medical profession has been intimidated into neglecting its accustomed role of relieving this form of human misery.
(10) A large and well-entrenched enforcement bureaucracy has developed a
vested interest in the status quo, and has effectively thwarted all but the
most marginal reforms.
(11) Legislative invocations of the criminal sanction have automatically and
unthinkingly been extended from narcotics to marijuana to the flood of
new mind-altering drugs that have appeared in recent years, thereby
compounding the pre-existing problem.
A clearer case of the misapplication of the criminal sanction would be difficult to imagine.
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 332-33 (1968) (emphasis added).
314. A recent national opinion poll found that seventy-four percent of Americans
(6)

see the War on Drugs as a losing cause.

THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE
& THE PRESS, INTERDICTION AND INCARCERATION STILL Top REMEDIES: 74% SAY
DRUG WAR BEING LOST 1 (Mar. 21, 2001), available at http://www.people-press.org/

reports/print.php3?ReportlD=16 (last visited Jan. 15, 2003). The same poll, however,
revealed that about fifty percent of Americans believe that interdiction of the drug
supply and the arrest of illegal drug sellers are still the most effective anti-drug policies. Id. Looking more specifically at users of illegal drugs, as opposed to those who
profit from the drug trade, the poll found the public to be "more compassionate than
condemnatory," as a majority of Americans (fifty-two percent) believe that drug use
should be treated as a disease, compared to thirty-five percent who favor treating it as
a crime. Id.
315. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Thinking Seriously About Alternatives to Drug Prohibition, 121 DAEDALUS, Summer 1992, at 85, 89-94 (discussing alternatives to drug
prohibition). There are actually more sophisticated distinctions between interest
groups in the drug policy debate, characterized by one commentator as the "progressive legalizers," the "progressive prohibitionists," the "reactionary prohibitionists,"
and the "hardcore libertarians." Id. Although the latter two groups are not amenable
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alternative means to enhance public safety and public health more
effectively. In the search for more effective alternatives, it is essential to identify workable approaches that can help to build common
ground between those who currently hold differing views on drug
policy.
The Task Force supports the fundamental proposition that any
sanction related to drug use should result in less harm than the use
of the drug itself. Accordingly, a shift from the current system of
punitive drug control towards a system of regulatory drug control
would greatly reduce the harm that has resulted from the use of
criminal sanctions. As an alternative to the criminal justice response, a public health response to drug use would shift resources
away from the expensive and ineffective practices of arrest and incarceration, and more towards an expansion of addiction treatment, drug education, and research. A more compassionate
response to drug abuse, coupled with comprehensive and honest
drug education for both youth and adults, should ultimately result
in more well-informed and responsible attitudes towards drugs.
Drug use can result in significant harm to the drug user, although
many, if not most, drug users do not experience serious adverse
consequences from drug use. To the extent that drug use harms the
user, a public health response is appropriate. Drug use, however,
can result in harm to other persons or property. When that occurs,
either criminal or civil remedies may be appropriate, and the focus
of the legal process should be where the harm is the greatest.
Based on its thorough review of the use of criminal sanctions in
connection with drugs, the Task Force arrived at the following
conclusions:
1. The use of criminal sanctions is an ineffective means to discourage drug use or to address the problems arising from drug
abuse. Further, the use of criminal sanctions is extremely
costly in both financial and human terms, unduly burdening
the taxpayer and bringing about significantly more harm than
the use of drugs themselves.
2. Rather than criminally punish persons for drug use per se, any
state sanction or remedy should aim at reducing the harm directly caused to others by persons using drugs. As is currently
the case with alcohol abuse, civil remedies are already available for courts to impose on persons who use drugs to the detriment of their dependents (children and the elderly) and
to compromise, considerable common ground could be found between the other two
factions. Id.
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others. Such civil remedies, supported by a court's contempt
power, are used in the context of dependency proceedings,
paternity and dissolution actions and in cases of domestic
violence.
3. Criminal sanctions should continue to be imposed upon persons who commit non-drug criminal offenses, even if the court
can determine that a chemical dependency contributed to the
offense. The courts, however, should provide those offenders
with the opportunity to receive addiction treatment.
4. The shift away from the use of criminal sanctions requires that
the state significantly expand its investment in drug addiction
treatment, drug education, and drug abuse prevention programs, which have consistently been shown to be much more
cost-effective responses to the problems created by drugs in
society. The legislature could obtain funding for those programs from the substantial cost savings that will accrue from
no longer relying on the use of criminal sanctions.
B.

Future Considerations

A major impediment to fundamental drug policy reform in
Washington (and throughout the country) is the breadth of federal
drug law. The Task Force shares the widespread recognition that
existing system is a very costly failure, but believes that federal regulation of drug use has been and is so pervasive as to "preempt the
field," inhibiting the development and testing of alternatives. Yet,
drug policy reform clearly needs one or more such alternatives.
Federal law should permit the states to develop their own drug
control strategies and structures, using the federal system to allow
the states to be laboratories for change and improvement of public
laws and institutions. Allowing Washington and the other states to
design and build (and, as appropriate, redesign and rebuild) legal
and regulatory structures for drug control will enable the experimentation with strategies and systems in search for an effective
means to deal with the problems that accompany drug use. The
present system is a failure, and there is no widespread agreement
about what system would be best. Experimentation is necessary,
and the states should be free to do it. Hopefully, the experimentation will produce successful strategies and structures that all the
states could adopt.316
316. The notion that states should assume more authority over drug control seems
to be gaining ground, at least in the western United States. The Western Governors'
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In the context of greater state control over drug policy, the Task
Force discussed a range of long-term options for reform, including
the notion of developing a new, state-level regulatory structure for
controlled substances, whereby an extensive network of laws and
regulations would govern manufacturing, sale, labeling, and advertising. Additionally, strict licensing requirements would apply to
those dispensing controlled substances. In such a system, revenue
from taxation could cover the cost of regulation and contribute to
the cost of addiction treatment and drug abuse prevention. In addition, replacing the punitive system with a regulatory system
would create a different incentive structure that would help encourage drug addicts to seek treatment.
The Task Force considered the regulatory approach particularly
appropriate at this time for marijuana, for which the cost of current
criminal sanctions far outweighs any societal benefit received. If
states would regulate and tax marijuana in the same manner as alcohol, including tight control over manufacture and sale, strict prohibition of availability to minors, and restrictions on advertising,
numerous societal benefits would accrue, including: 1) a separation
of the market for marijuana from the market for other more harmful drugs; 2) severely curtailing or eliminating the black market for
marijuana, thereby putting out of business those dealers who sell to
youth; and 3) a reduction in the consumption of more harmful
drugs, such as alcohol and cocaine.
The Task Force also examined other thorny issues, including the
use of drug testing, the use of non-penal sanctions, and questions
about the regulation and control of prescription drugs. Without
arriving at any specific conclusions, the Task Force nevertheless envisioned the next stage in the consideration of drug policy reform
options.
Association, of which Washington is a member, issued the following policy statement
in June 2000:
States, rather than the federal government, are in a better position to understand the substance abuse problem confronting them. The federal government needs to work closely with the states to provide the resources
necessary to meet the individual and unique needs of each state rather than
approaching the issue in a one-size-fits-all manner.
W.

GOVERNOR'S

ASs'N,

POLICY RESOLUTION

00-024:

DRUG

POLICY IN THE WEST

§ B2 (2000), available at http://www.westgov.org/wga/policy/00/00024.htm (last visited
Jan. 15, 2003). A central recommendation of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York in 1.994 also presupposed the end of federal control over drug policy and
"permitting states to devise alternatives to prohibition .... [A] new approach to drug
policy should leave state and local governments free to employ the full panoply of
coercive penal sanctions when drug use is relevant to conduct affecting others." A
WISER COURSE, supra note 313, at 572.
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The present charge has been to assess the effectiveness of criminal sanctions related to drugs, and the Task Force has concluded
that such sanctions are ineffective. The next challenge is to devise
a workable alternative system that achieves the key policy objectives of promoting public health, preserving public order, and protecting children in a cost-effective manner.
As a framework for the development of a more effective, less
costly, and more humane drug policy, the Task Force proposes the
following guiding principles:
1. Any public policy toward drug use should result in no more
harm than the use of the drugs themselves.
2. Any public policy toward drug use should address the underlying causes and the resulting harms of drug abuse instead of
attempting to discourage drug abuse through the use of criminal sanctions.
3. The state should regulate the use of drugs in a manner that
recognizes a citizen's individual liberties while answering the
need to preserve public health, public safety, and public
order.
4. The state should regulate the use of drugs in a manner that
uses scarce public resources as efficiently as possible.
Any reform of drug policy will likely be incremental, not only to
allow for the phasing in of new measures, but also to provide opportunities to evaluate their effectiveness. Other, more fundamental reforms may be developed and implemented at a later stage,
particularly after a sufficient infrastructure for the delivery of drug
treatment services is in place.
Where criminal sanctions are an ineffective and inappropriate
means to address the problems that arise from drug abuse, the Task
Force looked to Washington's current policy toward alcohol use,
articulated by the general proposition in Washington Revised Code
§ 70.96A.010:
It is the policy of this state that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution solely because of their consumption of alcoholic beverages but rather
should, within available funds, be afforded a continuum of treatmay lead normal lives as productive
ment in order that 3they
17
members of society.
The Task Force believes it is possible for the people of Washington to fashion a similar general policy with regard to other drugs, a
317.

WASH.

REV.

CODE

§ 70.96A.010 (2002).
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fiscally responsible policy that would carefully balance the exercise
of individual civil liberties with the effective preservation of public
order, while also providing compassionate treatment to those in
need. The Task Force believes, as well, that there is a great need
for comprehensive education of the public and open-minded dialogue about the very complex and serious issues addressed in this
Report. Both inside, but especially outside, of government, very
bright lights should be shone on the failure of our drug policies and
the tremendous costs, both human as well as financial, they have
exacted on our society and on the societies of many other nations.
Drug policy sorely needs change, and its form should be widely
debated and implemented with all deliberate speed.
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